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FORWARD TO FUNDAMENTAL
ALTERATION: ADDRESSING ADA TITLE II
INTEGRATION LAWSUITS AFTER
OLMSTEAD V. L. C.
JEFFERSON D.E. SMINH* AND STEVE P. CALANDRILLO*

ABSTRACT
In 1999 the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Olmstead v.
L.C. by Zimring, which has been called the Brown v. Board of
Education for the law of disability discrimination. The Court
ultimately agreed with the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and
held that the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), along
with its supplementary Integration Regulation, requires a State
that offers treatment to persons with disabilities to provide
such treatment in a community setting where such a placement
would not be an unreasonable change or a fundamental
alteration in the State's program. Advocates of community care
have long argued that such care is superior to institutionalized
care in cost, treatment success, and equity. The ADA is the
latest in a long line of legal avenues whereby advocates of
disability rights have attempted to fashion some right to
community care for developmentally disabled and mentally ill
people. Opponents argue that the application of the Integration
Regulation adopted by courts and the Department of Justice is
beyond the reach of the ADA, which is limited to situations of
uneven treatment as between disabled and non-disabled
individuals. Left open by the current debate, and by the
opinions interpreting the relevant provisions of the ADA, is
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what measures might constitute "unreasonable modifications"
or "fundamental alterations" such that the ADA would not
require them.
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INTRODUCTION - THE MOvE TO INTEGRATION
A.

The L.C. Case and Title lI of the ADA

In June 1999, the United States Supreme Court decided the
landmark case of Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring.1 The case has been
1. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). This paper refers to the case as L.C. rather than as
Olmstead, due to the large number of cases in the Eleventh Circuit with the latter
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lauded by disability advocates and described as the "Brown v.
Board of Education for the law of disability discrimination."2 In
L.C., the Court concluded that the Georgia Department of
Human Resources ("DHR") had violated Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act 3 ("ADA"') by confining two

mentally disabled individuals, L.C. and E.W.,4 in a segregated
institution despite concessions by the individuals' treating
5
professionals that a community setting would be appropriate.
L.C. and E.W. are mentally retarded individuals who also
have mental disorders.6 Before litigation, both were voluntary
patients at the Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta ("GRHA"), 7 where they were confined in a locked psychiatric unit.8
L.C.'s most recent institutionalization began in 1992.9 Her
condition stabilized one year after her institutionalization, and
the State's treating physician determined that she could

moniker.
2. Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 654 (2000)
(footnote omitted); see also Robin Toner & Leslie Kaufman, Ruling Upsets Advocates
for the Disabled,N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at A24 (reporting that disability rights
groups viewed L.C. as a victory).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000). Title II of the ADA "sets forth prohibitions
against discrimination in... public services furnished by govermental entities."
L.C., 527 U.S. at 589. The ADA also contains Title 1, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117
(1994), which deals with discrimination in employment, and Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§
21181-12189 (1994), which deals with discrimination in public accommodations
provided by private entities.
4. Given the publicity of the case, the parties' identities are no longer secret.
L.C.'s actual name is Lois Curtis, and E.W.'s name is Elaine Wilson. See Linda
Greenhouse, States Limited on Institutionalization,N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at A16.
To be consistent with the monikers used in the legal materials, this Article will use
the shortened forms. Also note that throughout this Article "mental disability"
will refer to both developmental disability and mental illness.
5. L.C., 527 U.S. at 593, 597. Community care generally refers to residential
based settings in which patients are afforded substantially greater freedom and
flexibility in treatment and living than they would experience in an institutional
environment. See L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 897, 905 (11th Cir.
1998); Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 68 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (D. Md.
1999).
6. See Brief for Petitioners at *8, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581
(1999) (No. 98-536), available at 1999 WL 54623. L.C. was diagnosed as having
undifferentiated schizophrenia and mild retardation. See id. E.W. was diagnosed
with a borderline personality disorder and mild retardation. See id.
7. See L.C., 527 U.S. at 593. According to the Court, both were voluntarily
admitted. The Petitioners' brief, however, alleges that E.W. was involuntarily
admitted after hallucinations and L.C. involuntarily after violent behavior.
8. See Brief for Petitioners at *6-*7, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581
(1999) (No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL 54623.
9. See L.C., 527 U.S. at 593. This Article follows the fact pattern set forward by
the Court inL.C, rather than the Petitioners' brief.
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appropriately be treated in a community setting. 0 She was 'still
institutionalized at GRH-A, however, when suit was filed two
years later." E.W. was most recently admitted in 1995.12 In
1996, her condition stabilized, allowing her treating physician
and a clinical psychologist at GRH-A to conclude that she
could be cared for in a community setting. 3 E.W. nonetheless
remained institutionalized until the district court ordered the
provision of community care. 4
L.C. brought suit in May 1995, and E.W. intervened in the
suit in January 1996.1s They alleged, inter alia, that the State had
violated Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations
by failing to provide treatment in a community setting after
such a setting was deemed appropriate. The district court
granted them summary judgment. 6 Title II of the ADA
provides, in pertinent part, that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by such entity." 7 Under Title II of the ADA, a
public entity may avoid making changes to its programs if it
can make out a fundamental alteration or unreasonable
modification defense. 8 Department of Justice ("DOJ")
regulations provide, in consonance with ADA (and
Rehabilitation Act) case law, that:
A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability,
unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the

10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
*2, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 US. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), available at 1999
WL 149653.
14. See id.; L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 1:95-cv-1210-MHS,.1997 WL 148674
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 26,1997) (ordering the provision of community care).
15. See L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895 (11th Cir. 1998).
16. See L.C., 527 U.S. at 594.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (emphasis added).
18. 28 C.F.R. § 130(b)(7) (2000). Although there is a conceptual distinction
between the two 'terms, "unreasonable modification" and "fundamental
alteration" are frequently used interchangeably as a convenient shorthand.
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service, program, or activity.' 9
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, the State argued that
the plaintiffs had not been discriminated against "by reason of
such disability" because they had not been denied anything
available to non-disabled people.2" The State asserted that the
plaintiffs were denied community placements not because of
their disability, but because of a lack of funding.21 Thus, it was
argued, no violation of the ADA should be found.'
In other words, the State argue[d] that the ADA requires a
comparison of the treatment of individuals with disabilities
against that of healthy non-disabled persons.... Reduced to
its essence, the State's argument is that Title II of the ADA
affords no protection to individuals with disabilities who
receive public
services designed only for individuals with
disabilities.23
The circuit court rejected the State's argument. The court
relied on the "Integration Regulation" issued by the
Department of Justice, which is entrusted with the task of
promulgating regulations to give content to the general
provisions of Title H. The court also gave deference to the
DOJ's interpretation of the regulation and the ADA.24 The
Integration Regulation provides that a "public entity shall
administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities." z To support such deference, the
court cited legislative history suggesting that Title II of the
ADA is intended in part to stamp out unnecessary segregation
of disabled people.26 Further, the court determined that a
malevolent motive was not necessary to constitute a violation;
even if the denial of community care was motivated by a lack
of funds, a violation could still result.2 Essentially, the court
adopted the view that the regulation provides that unnecessary
segregation is itself a type of discrimination redressable by
19. Id. (emphases added).
20. L.C., 138 F.3d at 896.
21. Id. at 902.

22. Id.
23.
24
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 896.
Id. at 896-98.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
L.C., 138 F.3d at 898.
Id. at902.
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Title II.
The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not conclusively order
the provision of community care. Instead, the court returned
the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the
plaintiffs' suggested relief would coristitute a fundamental
alteration, including a determination of whether the additional
expenditures necessary to treat the plaintiffs in communitybased care would be unreasonable given the demands of the
mental health budget.'
Few cases and little scholarship have discussed the
boundaries of the fundamental alteration defense in the context
of community-care cases or have even provided a framework
on which arguments could hang. Indeed, the absence of clear
limits is a trait that Title II community-care cases share to a
degree with other ADA cases under all titles.2 9 This problem is
worsened, however, by Title II's lack of specific regulatory
guidance (which is available in the employment and public
accommodations contexts) and the absence of well-developed
Title II case law.
Before the district court had a chance to consider the
fundamental alteration issue on remand, the Supreme Court
elected to review the Eleventh Circuit's opinion. 0 The Supreme
Court agreed that the Integration Regulation, when properly
interpreted to require community care where appropriate, was
in accord with the ADA's statutory language and congressional
intent, and thus within the implementation powers of the
DOJ.3 ' It confirmed that the unnecessary institutionalization of
28. Id. at 905.
29. See generally Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an
Employer's FinancialHardshipBecomes "'Undue"Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391 (1995) (noting that the ADA provides no clear limits to
its application and proposing a methodology in the employment context to limit
that application).
30. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 525 U.S. 1054 (1998) (granting certiorari).
Following the Supreme Court's
grant of the petition for a writ of certiorari, the district court issued a
decision on remand, rejecting [the State's] fundamental alteration
defense. The court found that the annual cost to the State of providing
community-based treatment to L.C. and E.W.-about $20,000 each-was
not unreasonable in relation to the State's overall mental health budget,
which was $706.8 million in fiscal year 1998.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *5 n.1,
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL
149653 (citations omitted).
31. See Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 581 (1999).

702

HarvardJournalofLaw & PublicPolicy

[Vol. 24

individuals amounted to segregation and discrimination
prohibited by Title II. In an effort to afford states greater
discretion, though, the Supreme Court recognized that the
fundamental alteration test, as restrictively articulated by the
Eleventh Circuit, may sometimes prove too difficult for states
to satisfy.32 As the Court noted, it is unlikely that a state could
ever prevail if courts simply compared (1) the expense entailed
in placing a mentally disabled plaintiff in a community-based
treatment program against (2) the state's entire mental health
33
budget.
The Court announced a new formulation of the fundamental
alteration component of the reasonable modifications
regulation that would allow the states some deference. The
Court's formulation requires the defendant state to show that,
in the allocation of available resources, providing immediate
relief for the plaintiff would be inequitable given the State's
overall obligation to a large and diverse population of mentally
disabled individualsm The Court added that the ADA was not
meant to compel states to phase out institutions and that states
must have more leeway than the courts below understood the
fundamental alteration defense to allow.3'
Courts, advocates, states, and practitioners, however, still do
not have precise guidance as to what would be considered an
unreasonable modification or a fundamental alteration. Given
the tremendous expense of large scale public interest litigation
and the tendency of such cases to be resolved by way of
settlement, the further development of these principles in the
common law fashion will be slow. This Article explores some
of the boundaries that the Supreme Court left undefined. Part
I.B details the arguments made in favor of community care for
the mentally disabled and provides a history of efforts to
improve treatment of the mentally disabled, including the
creation and application of the ADA. Part I.C argues that the
Supreme Court was correct in rejecting the narrow view of
ADA Title II proffered by the State in L.C. Part I.D offers a
partial explanation of why federal intervention in the
community-care area was necessary and appropriate. Part I.E
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 604.
Id.

No. 3]

Forwardto FundamentalAlteration

highlites problems that could result from an overbroad
implementation of the. Integration Regulation and notes the
need to cabin its application. Finally, Part II provides a guide to
advocates and scholars for analyzing arguments attempting to
create a narrow interpretation of the Integration Regulation,
'and discusses the various arguments in two classes. The first
class, program integrity arguments, are discussed in Part II.B in
the context of three general categories --or "ideal types"-of

suits. The second class, magnitude arguments, are discussed in
Part ll.C generally-as they might apply to a large class action
of any of the three ideal types.
B. Efforts Towards Community Care
1. A BriefTreatment of the Casefor Community Care

Community-care advocates argue that such care is superior
to institutional care in terms of quality, cost, and equity. In the
1980s, studies were conducted in which mentally disabled
individuals were randomly placed in either institutional or
residential settings. These studies led to a "general
conclusion.., that alternative care is more effective and less
costly than mental hospitalization."36 "In fact, regardless of the
outpatient setting used, the outcome indices by which their
effectiveness is measured, or the patient population using
them, alternative care programs have universally provided
37
more positive results more cheaply than institutionalization."
By contrast, opponents of institutional care decry its
conditions and its conditioning. Instances of abuse and neglect
have been documented regarding institutional care.38 Residents
and their families complain of unsanitary conditions, abuse by
residents, and neglect by caregivers. 39 Even for those who do
36. Antony B. Kapper, Comment, Finding a Right in State Constitutions for
Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 768-69 (1993) (quoting
CHARLES A. KIESLER & AMY E. SIBULKIN, MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION: MYrHS AND
FACTS ABOUT A NATIONAL CRISIS 179 (1987)).

37. Id. at 769 (citing KIESLER & SIBULKIN, supra note 36, at 158-59, 172-73).
38. See Dana M. Bessette, Note, Reinterpreting the ADA: Findinga Freedom from
Unnecessary Segregation, 24 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 131, 166
(1998) (citing DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK
WARS 19-20 (1984)).
39. See, e.g., Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 900-01 (5th Cir. 1988) (plaintiffs
alleging, among other things, that "residents were left to 'play in each other's
feces' . . . medications were poorly monitored . . . [and the plaintiff] was
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not suffer egregious neglect, life in large institutions often leads
to a degree of institutional dependence, which manifests in a
loss of social and vocational competencies and atrophy of the
ability to live outside the institution.4 ° Studies show that those
in community-based treatment programs spend more time
with friends and social groups, have a higher level of selfesteem, show fewer symptoms, and comply more consistently
with medication and treatment plans.4'
Proponents of community care also contend that communitybased programs can be provided and maintained at less cost
than large institutions. Strong evidence shows that per-patient
costs of community care are lower than per-patient costs in
large institutions. 42 One representative study of the costs of
treating 321 formerly institutionalized individuals with
psychiatric disorders found that community services cost
roughly half as much as institutional care.43 Costly overhead is
often cited as a reason for the high cost of institutional care.
Advocates argue that institutions must recreate many of the
services that exist as part of the background of daily life in the
community-in effect, that institutions suffer from
diseconomies of scale.44 Community programs, on the other
hand, often need not be built from scratch, but can be created
by making funding available to lease facilities. Further,
individuals placed in community programs often need less
assistance from state personnel because of family or friend
support. Likewise, some individuals receiving community-care
services can procure employment and be less dependent upon
repeatedly bitten by other residents").
40. See KIESLER & SIBULKIN, supra note 36, at 148.
41. See id. at 158-59.
42- See Klapper, supra note 36, at 770. For instance, a study completed two years
after the Kiesler and Sibulldn study "concluded that 'an intensive residential
treatment program was able to achieve comparable results in a short period of
time, with greater cost efficiency."' Id. at 770 n.127 (quoting Jeffery Bedell & John
C. Ward, An Intensive Community-Based TreatmentAlternative to State Hospitalization,
40 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 533, 535 (1989)); see also Herbert Bengelsdoff
et al., The Cost Effectiveness of Crisis Intervention: Admission Diversion Savings Can
Offset the High Cost of Service, 181 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 757 (1993)
(documenting cost savings achieved by community-based services).
43. See Aileen B. Rothbard et al., Service Utilization and Cost of Community Carefor
DischargedState HospitalPatients:A 3-Year Follow-Up Study, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
920, 925 (1999); see also Laird W. Heal, Institutions Cost More than Community
Services, 92 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 136, 136 (1987) (stating that the 1986 per
diem institutional cost was $127, compared with $81 for community care).
44. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to
Integration,64 TEMP. L. REV. 393,464 (1991).
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public financial support.
Community-care advocates argue that incompetence and
ignorance on the part of institution staff and administrators,
rather than cost or quality concerns, have led to the failure to
provide community placements.45 Further, activists argue that
administrative officials in institutions are slow to transfer
patients out of institutions because of their desire to maintain a
high occupancy rate. State officials are reluctant to downsize
46
and thereby jeopardize the jobs of institution employees.
Essentially, activists tell a story of regulatory "capture" and
bureaucratic inertia by state employees and administrators.47
Most directly relevant to the issue of disability
discrimination under the ADA is the activists' contention that
community care provides a greater level of social equality for
otherwise institutionalized individuals. Opponents of
institutional care maintain that unnecessary segregation as a
necessary
care
constitutes
condition
of receiving
48
written
that
Martha
Minow has
discrimination.
institutionalization results in the stigmatization of the
institutionalized individuals, which only aggravates the
discriminatory treatment of those that the powerful in society
deem different.49 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a
report prior to the enactment of the ADA that concurred
generally with Minow's view and included institutionalization
as a cause of discrimination against individuals with
45. See Amicus Curiae Brief of 58 Former State Commissioners and Directors of
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities in Support of Respondents at *25-

26, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat 1999
WL 143935.
46. See id.
47. See generally Paul B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice
Theory and InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995)

(discussing public choice theory generally, i.e., the notion that regulatory statutes
are often enacted, or blocked, at the behest of interest groups who stand to
benefit).
48. See A. Arrigo, The Logic of Identity and the Politics of Justice: Establishing a

Right to Community-Based Treatmentfor the InstitutionalizedMentally Disabled,18 NEW
ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1 (1992); Bessette, supra note 38; Cook, supra

note 44; Klapper, supra note 36; Bruce Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Comment, Community
Mental Health Treatment for the Mentally Ill-When Does Less Restrictive Treatment
Become a Right?, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1971 (1992).
49. Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally
Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 111 (1987); see also 136 CoNG. REC. H2603 (daily ed. May 22,1990) (statement
of Rep. Collins) ("To be segregated is to be misunderstood, even feared.").
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disabilities." Minow's and the Civil Rights Commission's view
accords with the view of community-care activists that
community care is not merely a medically and financially
superior option, but a morally and legally superior one as well.
2. A BriefHistory ofEfforts To Increase
the Use of Community Care
The history of discriminatory treatment towards the
mentally disabled has deep roots. John Locke wanted full
citizenship to be denied them: "Lunatics and Id[i]ots... [and]
Madmen" are not born into the "full state of Equality" because
51
they rely on others to "seek and procure their good for them."
According to John Stuart Mill, the principle of freedom from
interference does not apply to those "still in a state to require
being taken care of by others."' For these people, according to
Mill, despotism was a legitimate form of government.5 3
Before the proliferation of institutions in the mid-1800s, the
care of mentally disabled individuals was left to families, jails,
54
poorhouses, and ad hoc community arrangements.
Population growth and reaction to reformers such as Dorothea
Dix spurred the building of hospitals, but overcrowding6
resulted in physical restraint, seclusion, brutality, and neglect.

Community-care activists have argued that prejudice, as much
as altruism, motivated the proliferation of these segregated
hospitals,57 with government officials concluding that people
with disabilities were "not much above the animal" 58 and "not
far removed from the brute."59
50. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM Or
INDIVIDUAL ABILMES 32-34 (1983).
51. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 346-50 (Peter Laslett ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1965) (1690).
52. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton &
Company 1975) (1859).
53. Id.
54. See SUSAN M. CHANDLER, COMPETING REALITIES: THE COMPETING TERRAIN
OF MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY 11-12 (1990).
55. See Samuel W. Hamilton, The History of American Mental Hospitals, in ONE

HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY 73-78

U.K. Hall et al. eds., 1944).

56. See GERALD N. GROB, FROM ASYLUM TO COMMUNITY: MENTAL HEALTH
POLICY IN MODERN AMERICA 3 (1991).

57. See Cook, supra note 44, at 400.
58. Id. at 401 (quoting District of Columbia AppropriationsBills: Hearings Before the

House Comm. on Appropriations,67th Cong. 96 (1923)).
59. Id. (quoting STATE BD.OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTIONS, SPECIAL REPORT TO
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The efforts to supplant the large institutions with community
care began in earnest in the mid-1950s and continued in force
in the 1960s and 1970s. Political and legal activism led to the
deinstitutionalization of large numbers of the mentally illparticularly of the civilly committed. In response to the clamor
for reform, Congress enacted several laws, including the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,60 to protect various interests of
disabled individuals. Advances in psychotropic medications,
the development of the community-health-center movement,
and litigation brought by mental health advocates and civil
rights lawyers contributed to a dramatic reduction in the
number of individuals housed by the public mental health
system.6 ' Since the 1960s, nearly 1.5 million people have been
released into community settings.6 The movement, however,
did not eliminate institutional care, nor did it accomplish
comparable
deinstitutionalization
of
the
voluntarily
committed-such as the developmentally disabled individuals
inL.C.
Advocates have, without great success, pursued several
avenues for establishing a right to treatment in the least
restrictive environment. Courts held that there was no such
right under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
because, given the voluntary nature of the care, it could not be
said that the State was denying liberty. 63 In 1981 in Pennhurst
State School v. Halderman," the Supreme Court refused to find
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MENTAL DEFECTIVES IN VIRGINIA 20 (1916)).
60. Pub. L. No. 93-111, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
701-796 (2000)). Other notable laws include the Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998),
repealedby Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106402, 114 Stat. 1677 (2000) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001-15115) (setting
guidelines and providing partial funding for state-run programs in §§ 6021-6030);
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(1988) (codified in scattered section of 42 U.S.C.) (protecting disabled individuals
from discrimination in private housing); and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (2000) (requiring appropriate integration of
disabled students).
61. See Bessette, supra note 38, at 132.
6Z See id. at 163 (citing Linda Shaw, Stigma and the Moral Careers of Ex-Mental

PatientsLiving in Board and Care,20 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 285, 288 (1991)).
63. See, e.g., Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d
1239 (2d Cir. 1984) (overruling a deinstitutionalization decree based on due
process principles); Doe v. Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that minors voluntarily committed by their parents did not have a right
to treatment in the least restrictive environment).

64. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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an articulated right to treatment in the least restrictive
environment under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act ("DDA").' Four years later, in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,66 the Supreme Court
determined that mentally retarded persons do not constitute a
to heightened protection under the Equal
suspect class subject
67
Clause.
Protection
Courts also refused to find a right to the least restrictive
treatment in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
precursor to Title II of the ADA. Section 504 possesses
substantially similar language to Title II but is limited in its
application to entities receiving federal funds.61 U.S. Courts of
Appeals consistently held that the Rehabilitation Act did not
require that states place handicapped persons in the least
restrictive setting appropriate to their needs. In fact, the
Rehabilitation Act and its regulations have practically become a
dead letter as a remedy for segregated public treatment. 0
Even early efforts under the ADA and the Integration
Regulation met checkered results. 7' In 1993 in Williams v.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), repealed by Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-402,114 Stat.
1677 (2000) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001-15115 (2000)).
66. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
67. The Court struck down the classification, finding quasi-suspect
classification unnecessary to adequately protect the interests of the mentally
retarded. See id. at 442-46.
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
69. See, e.g., P.C. v. McGlaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033,1041 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding the
Rehabilitation Act "does not require all handicapped persons to be provided with
identical benefits," and that the Act "did not clearly establish an obligation to meet
[the plaintiff's] particular needs vis-A-vis the needs of other handicapped
individuals, but mandated only that services provided nonhandicapped
individuals not be denied [the plaintiff] because he is handicapped"); Ciampa v.
Ma. Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that health care
provider did not discriminate when it failed to develop greater capacity to treat
disabilities); Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the State had no affirmative duty under the Rehabilitation Act "to create less
restrictive community residential settings for them"). But see Jackson v. Fort
Stanton Hosp. and Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1299 (D.N.M. 1990)
(determining that defendant's failure to integrate individuals with severe
developmental disabilities in the community, while developing community
placements for less disabled individuals, violated Section 504).
70. See Cook, supra note 44, at 394-408 (arguing for application of the ADA to
the provision of segregated services).
71. For a relatively thorough history of ADA Title II and the Integration
Regulation, see generally Joanne Karger, Note, "Don't Tread On The ADA:"
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring and the Future of Community Integration for
Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1221 (1999) (cataloging the
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709

Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Services,' the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to find that the ADA
required states to provide specific levels of community care
and refused to impose the provision of such care to a small
class of mentally ill patients. In the same year, two federal
district courts split on the question of whether the
ADA
73
applied to unnecessarily institutionalized individuals.
The courts' treatment of the applicability of the Integration

Regulation solidified somewhat after the 1995 landmark case of
Helen L. v. DiDario.74 In Helen L., the Third Circuit held that the

regulation required the provision of community care to one
physically handicapped individual who qualified for the State's
community treatment program and, in general, held that the
Integration Regulation does indeed apply to unnecessarily
institutionalized individuals. 75 Research discovered that, since
Helen L., eleven additional federal court cases have issued
opinions respecting the question of whether the Integration
Regulation applies to make unnecessary institutionalization a
type of discrimination under the ADA, and ten courts have
followed the reasoning of Helen L. for individuals qualified for
outpatient treatment. 76 In L.C., the Supreme Court determined
Olmstead v. L.C. case and its history, and arguing that the Supreme Court should
have taken even a broader view of ADA Title II's integration mandate); see also
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,588-92 (1999) (laying out the history of
the ADA).
72. 609 N.E.2d 447 (Mass. 1993).
73. Compare Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346, 1357 (S.D. Iowa 1993)
(holding that "the ADA does not require deinstitutionalization of mentally
disabled individuals"), with Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1192 (S.D.
Ohio 1993) (holding that mentally retarded plaintiffs had succeeded in stating a
claim under the ADA).
74. 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Helen L., see infra Part II.B.3.a.
75. See Helen L., 46 F.3d at 328-29, 331-33.
76. See L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1998); Cramer v.
Chiles, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Messier v. Southbury Training
Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706(EBB), 1999 WL 20910, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 1999);
Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Cable
v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 973 F. Supp. 937, 941 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Greist v.
Norristown State Hosp., No. CIV. A. 96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Oct. 22, 1997); Charles Q. v. Houstoun, No. CIV. A. 1:CV-95-280, 1996 WL 447549,
at *3 (M.D. Pa. April 22,1996) (unpublished opinion); Williams v. Wasserman, 937
F. Supp. 524, 530 (D. Md. 1996); K.L. v. Valdez, No. 93-1359 BB/LCS (D.N.M.
1995) (refusing to dismiss ADA claims of children with developmental
disabilities) (unpublished); Wyatt v. Hanan, No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala. 1995) (stating
that ADA "requires that services of programs provided by a public entity
'integrate' qualified disabled) (unpublished). But cf. Jeffrey v. St. Clair, 933 F.
Supp. 963, 970 (D. Haw. 1996) (finding no discrimination by reason of disability
where State shut down experimental group care program and deinstitutionalized
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that the latter ten were right. The Court explicitly held that
"[u]njustified

isolation

.

.

.

is

properly

regarded

as

discrimination based on disability" prohibited by the ADA. 7
C. Application of the IntegrationRegulation
The Petitioners in L. C. argued that the application of the
Integration Regulation to unnecessarily institutionalized
individuals exceeded the scope of that regulation and the scope
of the DOJ's authority to define the forms of discrimination that
are prohibited by Title II. The State argued that the ADA
requires merely evenhanded treatment as between disabled
and non-disabled individuals in the provision of state
benefits.78 Although a full treatment of the arguments that the
Supreme Court addressed in L.C. is beyond the scope of this
discussion, legislative intent, traditional deference to
implementing agencies, and the weight of current case law
counseled in favor of the Supreme Court's adoption of the
DOJ's interpretation of the Integration Regulation, which
applied the regulation to unnecessarily institutionalized
individuals.
The Supreme Court was right to follow the DOJ's
interpretation. The DOJ is entrusted with the responsibility of
implementing ADA Title II and issuing regulations to define
prohibited forms of discrimination. Title II does not spell out
the forms of discrimination it prohibits. Instead, Congress
instructed that "the Attorney General shall promulgate
regulations in an accessible format that implement this part."7 9
That section directed the Attorney General (the head of the
DOJ), "to issue regulations setting forth the forms of
discrimination prohibited."8 In this way the ADA resembles
other vague statutes enacted by Congress, such as the Sherman
Act in antitrust law, whereby executive agencies take the lead
in defining the boundaries of the statute. Pursuant to this
congressional command, the DOJ promulgated the Integration
involuntarily criminally committed mentally ill individuals). The Jeffrey court
found that, because neither the experimental program nor the institution provided
contact with non-disabled individuals, a transfer from the former to the latter did
not implicate the Integration Regulation. Id.
77. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,597 (1999).
78. Id. at 598.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000).
80. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 52 (1990).
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Regulation. The Integration Regulation provides that "[a]
public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities
in the most integratedsetting appropriateto the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities,"81 and described "the most
integrated setting appropriate" as "a setting that enables
individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled
persons to the fullest extent possible."82
In L.C. and Helen L., the Supreme Court and Third Circuit,
respectively, relied upon and embraced the DOJ interpretation
of the Integration Regulation as articulated in briefs submitted
by the Government as amicus curiae. The DOJ described "the
most integrated setting appropriate" as "a setting that enables
individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled
persons to the fullest extent possible."83 The DOJ therefore
interpreted the Integration Regulation to require
a State that offers treatment to persons with disabilities to
provide such treatment in a community setting that offers
opportunities for interaction with persons without
disabilities, rather, than in an institution, when (1) the State's
treatment professionals have determined, in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment, that community
placement of the individual is appropriate, and (2) such a
placement would not require an unreasonable change in
state policy or a fundamental
alteration in the nature of the
4
State's treatment program.8
Thus, according to the DOJ and now the Supreme Court8 5
where (as in L.C.) the plaintiff is segregated unnecessarily, the
Integration Regulation applies and the remaining question is
whether the imposition of community placement-a "setting
that offers opportunities for interaction with persons without
disabilities"- would effect an unreasonable modification or a
fundamental alteration.
The Supreme Court soundly decided to afford the DOJ
interpretation of the Integration Regulation the deference
normally granted to an agency's interpretation of its own

81. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
82. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 469 (1996) (discussing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)-(e)).
83. Id.
84. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at *i,
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL
149653.
85. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,597 (1999).
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regulations. Under settled Supreme Court precedent, an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations is "controlling"
unless it is "plainly erroneous,"86 "inconsistent with the
regulation,"8 7 or a mere "'post hoc rationalizatio[n]' of... past
agency conduct.". The State argued that the regulation should
apply only" to services provided to both disabled and nondisabled- persons, but there is no such limitation in the
regulation. The regulation on its face applies to all services
administered by a public entity, thereby apparently including
those that are offered only to persons with disabilities. Thus,
the DOJ's interpretation accords with the regulation's plain
language and is neither "plainly erroneous" nor "inconsistent."
Further, the interpretation has been a matter of public record
since 1995 and is not a "post hoc rationalization" of past agency
conduct.89 Therefore, under the traditional deferential standard,
the Supreme Court accorded the DOJ its due discretion.
Moreover, statutory intent and traditional deference to
agencies assigned the responsibility of promulgating
regulations to implement a statute suggest that the DOJ and the
Supreme Court were justified in concluding that unnecessary
institutionalization constitutes a form of ADA discrimination
and that therefore their interpretation of the Integration
Regulation was within the bounds of Title II. A basic principle
of administrative law provides that where a governmental
agency is granted authority to give content to a general
statutory provision, the agency is entitled to deference.90 This
general principle was recently applied to the ADA by the
Supreme Court, and the Court held that the DOJ's views
regarding the application of the statute warranted such
deference. 9' The Court acknowledged that the DOJ was
86. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,512 (1994).
87. Id.
88. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,212 (1988) (citation omitted)).
89. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
"10-11, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat
1999 WL 149653.
90. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (stating that such interpretation is entitled to "controlling weight" unless it
is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute").
91. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998) ("As the agency directed by
Congress to issue implementing regulations, to render technical assistance
explaining the responsibilities of covered individuals and institutions, and to
enforce Title III [of the ADA] in court, the [Justice] Department's views are
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directed by Congress to issue implementing regulations and
was the agency principally responsible for the ADA's
enforcement.92 Thus, the DOJ interpretation of the statute was
entitled to controlling weight unless it was "arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Following
this principle, the Court properly afforded controlling weight
to the DOJ interpretation that unnecessary institutionalization
constitutes a form of discrimination prohibited by Title II.
The legislative history behind the enactment of the ADA
provides further support for the DOJ's and the Supreme
Court's view that unnecessary institutionalization constitutes a
form of prohibited discrimination.9 Although an exhaustive
legislative history is beyond the scope of this discussion, a
thumbnail sketch provides support for the Court's holding. In
findings accompanying ,the ADA, Congress determined that
"historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and . . . such forms of
discrimination ... continue to be a serious and pervasive social

problem."94 It also held that discrimination occurs in various
contexts
including
"institutionalization," 5
and
that
"individuals with disabilities continually encounter various
forms

of discrimination,

including

.

.

.

segregation."96

Legislative debates and hearings bear out that those findings
reflect an understanding that unjustified segregation
constitutes a form of discrimination. 97 Former Attorney General
Edwin Meese, who oversaw passage of the ADA and
participated in its hearings, has joined in the opinion that the
DOJ (and now Supreme Court) view accords with the statutory
authority granted the Department under Title 11. 98
entitled to deference." (citations omitted)).

92. Id.
93. See Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 599-600 (1999).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
95. Id. at § 12101(a)(3).
96. Id. at § 12101(a)(5).
97. See, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. S5116 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Simon) (stating that persons with disabilities "are hidden in institutions [and they]
are hidden in nursing homes"); 135 Cong. Rec. S4986 (daily ed. May 9, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Harkin) (the ADA is intended, in part, to get people "out of
institutions"); 136 Cong. Rec. H2447 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Miller) ("[I]t has been our unwillingness to see all people with disabilities that has
been the greatest barrier to full and meaningful equality. Society has made them
invisible by shutting them away in segregated facilities .... ").
98. See Brief of Edwin Meese as Amicus Curiae, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring,
527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536).
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Aside from statutory intent and agency discretion, the
Supreme Court held that unnecessary institutionalization can
properly be viewed as "discrimination" under traditional
definitions of the term." First, as mentioned above, unjustified
segregation can stigmatize those segregated, and this can lead
to further inferior treatment. Second, unjustified segregation
imposes a burden on the disabled not placed on the nondisabled. Whereas the institutionalized disabled person must
sacrifice involvement in community life to get the services they
need, non-disabled persons need not sacrifice community
living to get needed services. Third, unnecessary segregation
denies disabled persons public benefits offered to the nondisabled. This argument responds to the Petitioners' argument
that the ADA should not apply unless disabled individuals fail
to receive the same services received by non-disabled
individuals. Disabled people must indeed give up such
benefits: Where individuals must by reason of their disability
obtain needed services in a segregated setting, they are
deprived of equal access to the benefits of community livingpublic commons, parks, museums, and most other public
services.
This definition of discrimination is arguable, because it may
be contended that unnecessary institutionalization is not "by
reason of disability" but by reasons of poverty, administrative
inefficiency, or lack of public funds. Still, in the face of this
indeterminacy, Supreme Court deference to the DOJ under
Chevron was justified. Indeed, nearly every court that has
considered the question has concluded likewise: The DOJ acted
well within its regulatory and statutory authority to apply the
00
Integration Regulation to unnecessary institutionalization.
Given the foregoing legislative history and the deferential
standard applied to agency interpretations of their own
regulations, not to mention the policy benefits of community
care discussed above, the Supreme Court took the proper
position that the Integration Regulation does in fact apply to
unnecessarily institutionalized people. Thus, we now move
beyond the question of whether or not the Integration

99. See L.C., 527 U.S. at 600 (1999).
100. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (cataloguing cases ruling on
Integration Regulation).
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Regulation applies, and forward to the reasons behind the
Court's intervention in this arena.
D. The Needfor FederalIntervention
While the above discussion highlights the reasons
supporting the Supreme Court's conclusion in L.C., another
concern weighed in favor of the Court's holding-the need for
federal legislative and judicial intervention. In ruling that the
ADA and the Integration Regulation applied to bar
discrimination
against
unnecessarily
institutionalized
individuals, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the need
for federal involvement when major state power centers (here,
state legislatures and the corresponding state mental hospitals
that they funded) are not well suited to correct the problem at
hand.'01 It is well chronicled that mentally disabled individuals
are limited in their capacity to represent their interests in
majoritarian power centers; mentally handicapped people vote
less frequently, donate less money, and lobby less loudly. The
Supreme Court acknowledged this explicitly in Cleburnethough mentally handicapped residents were able to "attract
the attention of the lawmakers," they could not "mandate the
desired legislative responses" to deal with the prejudice they
faced. °2 One commentator has argued that such relative
disenfranchisement and vulnerability justifies intervention by
03
courts and legislatures.'
Ample evidence indicated that state institutions were
providing poor care to the mentally disabled, and that
institutions continued to do so despite the data demonstrating
that community care was both less expensive and more
effective at improving patients' lives.' °4 This reality provides a
measure of empirical evidence that states were not sufficiently
equipped, or perhaps not sufficiently motivated, to resolve the
problems facing the unnecessarily institutionalized mentally
disabled population.

101. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
102 Id. at445.
103. Steve P. Calandrillo, Corralling Kevorkian: Regulating Physician Assisted
Suicide in America, 7 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 41 (1999) (discussing the vulnerability
of infirm elderly persons and the need for legislative and judicial intervention to
protect their interests in the physician assisted suicide context).
104. See Kapper, supranote 36, at 769-70.
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Why have states demonstrated such inability, or at least such
a lack of success, in fixing the problem? A number of
explanations are possible, including the institutional inertia,
regulatory capture, and ratcheting effects that can burden state
power centers. Too commonly,
[p]olitical goals to save money, bureaucratic pressures to
allocate mental health funds primarily to state institutions,

and neighborhood resistance to the establishment of
alternative community facilities have brought about the
failure of deinstitutionalization. These forces have created a
"revolving door" for persons with mental disabilities ....

Unfortunately, the legislative response at the state level,
shaped by political and fiscal pressures, does not adequately
weigh the interests of this population. 05
Moreover, legislatures can fall victim to "ratcheting" effects.
Once state legislatures have granted the funding to build and
run state mental hospitals, eliminating them becomes hard
even if they are not performing as desired. Once the funding is
ratcheted up, it becomes difficult to ratchet back. The cries of
politically powerful groups who support the status quo can
drown out the voices of less powerful mentally disabled
individuals.0 6 As Jonathan Zasloff has argued, "[o]fficials will
focus on satisfying their political masters because they can do
pressure becomes a means of rationing
little else: political
10 7
scarce resources."
In some instances, this inertia might affect state power
centers while not handcuffing federal ones. Given the smaller
number of people that run state governing bodies and mental
hospitals, it is understandable that there would be anomalies
and problems in some of the results. Thus, we witness a wide

105. Susan Lee, Heller v. Doe: Involuntary Civil Commitment and the "Objective"
Language ofProbability,20 AMER. J.L. & MED. 457,458 (1994).
106. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. HI. L. REV. 533, 547
(1983). Easterbrook argues that "although legislators have individual lists of
desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes
impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice." Id. Rather,
because of flaws in legislative voting processes, it "is fairly easy to show that
someone with control of the agenda can manipulate the choice so that the
legislature adopts proposals that only a minority support." Id. This idea relates
also to the notion of capture, in which larger power centers are captured by
smaller power centers. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 120-25 (1980).
10Z Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and Bureaucrats:A Prehistoryof Welfare
Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225,257 (1998).
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range in state treatment of the mentally disabled; some states
have been quite good while others have been quite poor,
showing little sign of improvement. l8
In the context of a smaller system, there is arguably more
potential for that system to be a closed one, and certainly more
potential for legislative capture. 09 Viewed through a public
choice optic, a state legislature is easier to capture than the
federal Congress. State legislatures typically have fewer
members than Congress, and successful campaigns for seats on
state legislatures typically require far smaller war chests. 110
Thus, organizations with funds and voters can strongly
influence the composition and conduct of state legislatures.
This reality relates to James Madison's notion, presented in
The FederalistPapersand counseling in favor of a strong federal
government, that tyranny of the majority is more likely to occur
in a small group than in a large one:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the
distinct parties, .. . the more frequently will a majority be
found of the same party; and... the more easily will [that
majority] concert and execute [its] plans of oppression.
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade
i
the rights of other citizens ....
When relatively fewer people control decisions (i.e., as in
state legislatures), chances are greater that we will see more
108. See DAVID BRADDOCK, THE STATE OF THE STATES IN DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES: 2000 STUDY SUMMARY 6 (2000), available at http://www.uic.edu/
("In 1998, 21 states
depts/idhd/StateoftheStates/StatesSummary2000.pdf
provided 70% or more of their residential services in settings for six or fewer
persons. However, in the 14 states of Kentucky, Mississippi, Texas, Georgia,
Oklahoma, Illinois, New Jersey, Alabama, Virginia, Utah, Tennessee, Ohio,
Delaware, and Louisiana, at least 40% of all persons living in out-of-home
residential placements were in institutional facilities for 16 or more persons.').
109. See Easterbrook, supra note 106.
110. Compare Samantha Sanchez, Average ContributionSize in State Legislatures, at
http://www.followthemoney.org/issues/contribsize.html (uly 2, 1999). ("Total
funds raised by all legislative candidates in the 12 states range from a low of $1.5
million in Idaho to $41.1 million in Illinois.") (emphasis in original), with The
Center for Responsive Politics, 2000 Election Overview: Stats at a Glance, at
http://www.opensecrets.org (last visited May 21, 2001) (showing that national
senate races in 2000 between just two candidates resulted in an average total
spending of nearly $11 million). Both organizations are non-partisan research
centers.
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63-64 Games Madison) (acob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).

HarvardJournalofLaw & PublicPolicy

[Vol. 24

extreme results than those which we would see on a national
scale where far more voices may be heard -and more publicly.
In this context-one of institutional inertia, capture, and
ratcheting-a more powerful, more comprehensive federal
force may be required to come in, break down barriers, and
make state institutions change their course, where state
institutions are not so able." 2
This phenomenon is analogous to what our country
experienced during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s."'
States were the bodies causing the discrimination problem and
showed little capacity to resolve it, due to a combination of
political, social, and institutional inertia." 4 Accordingly, it was
the federal government, along with its courts, that instigated
change, just as we have witnessed with the ADA and in L.C.
The Supreme Court's holding in L.C. thus exemplifies federal
intervention as a route to solve problems that trouble states.
The states' demonstrated incapacity counsels in favor of such
intervention. All three branches of the government came
together in an attempt to remedy the problem of discrimination
against the mentally disabled in state institutions. An Article I
legislative body (Congress) passed a federal law (the ADA), an
Article II executive arm (the DOJ) promulgated a regulation
interpreting that legislation, and Article III federal courts
stepped in to affirm the law's validity and force.
This is not to suggest that the federal legislative and
executive branches are unconstrained by institutional inertia
and regulatory capture-merely that there are some occasions
in which states will be fettered and the federal government will
112. Somewhat tangentially, however, there has been speculation that federal
lawsuits against the states under Title II constitute unconstitutional abrogations of
state sovereign immunity. For an in depth discussion on the topic, see generally
James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims Against State
Entities Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct After Seminole Tribe and Flores, 41
ARIz. L. REv. 651 (1999). From a policy perspective, the weaknesses of state power
centers might cut against such a restrictive view of federal authority. Although
interesting, these issues are beyond the reach of this paper, as they were beyond
the reach of the Supreme Court's opinion in Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S.
581, 588 (1999) (ruling that "[t]he case, as it comes to us, presents no constitutional
question").
113. See Gabriella Davi, A Progression Toward Freedom: Protecting the Disabled
Under the Ku Klux Klan Act, 20 CARDOZo L. REv. 1019,1028-30 (1999).
114. See generally Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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be less so."' Federal courts likewise do not act with complete
freedom-with traditional reliance on stare decisis, no
institution may be subject to institutional inertia to as large a
degree as our court system." 6 Still, in public choice terms, the

life tenure afforded federal judges by Article IIV17 allows
federal courts to be relatively free from capture. Thus, again,
there are some occasions in which states will be fettered and
federal courts will be less so. In L.C., the Supreme Court
confronted just such an occasion.
E. Problemsof BroadApplication of Title II and the Integration
Regulation: The Need for a Discussionof FundamentalAlteration
and UnreasonableModification

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion in L.C., if no
meaningful boundaries are placed on the sweep of the
Integration Regulation, it could expand beyond intended
practicable limits. For example, two recent district court
opinions issued before the Supreme Court's L.C. decision
stretched the limits of states' duties. In Cramer v. Chiles,"18 a
federal district court within the Eleventh Circuit (the Circuit
that issued the opinion in L.C.) relied in part on the ADA to bar
the implementation of a Florida statute that would have
eliminated funding for private Intermediate Care Facilities for
the Developmentally Disabled ("ICF/DDs")."9 The court held
that the statute would have impermissibly denied meaningful
choice and resulted in unnecessary institutionalization. 20
Notably, the court failed to address the fundamental alteration
issue, or even to acknowledge its existence, and in a fashion
harking back to the judicial activism of the school
desegregation era, maintained jurisdiction to appoint a panel of
experts to develop a transitional plan.'
In Kathleen S. v. Department of Public Welfare,"2 a district court
115. See Easterbrook, supra note 106.
116. See Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare
Decisis, 60 U. PHIT. L. REV. 89,123 (1998).
117. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
118. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
119. Id. at 1353-54.
120. Id. at 1353.
121. Id. at 1354.
122. 10 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Pa. 1998). This case is discussed infra at Part
II.B.3.a.
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within the Third Circuit (the same Circuit that decided Helen
L.) held a violation of the ADA when Pennsylvania closed a
hospital and failed to create sufficient community-care facilities
for the released persons. Whereas Helen L. and L.C. involved
few plaintiffs and did not purport to alter the design of the
state programs, Crameropenly wrested control from the state of
the decisions as to what programs to provide and fund, and
Kathleen S. required the state to create substantial new
programs. In addition to these cases, in several jurisdictions
community-care activists have brought pending litigation
seeking sweeping consequences, including claims to force the
closure of institutions and the creation of vast new communitycare systems.
Five rules of action illustrate the need for limits. First,
individuals have different conditions and needs.123 Where
failing to provide care in the "most integrated setting
appropriate" constitutes a prima facie case of discrimination,
the wide range of individual needs poses problems.
Presumably a state should not be required to create infinite
types of community-care programs in order to provide the most
integrated setting appropriate for each person of infinite
human variation. Second, conditions change. At times certain
types of care will suffice for a particular person when at other
times such care will not suffice for that person, and when
conditions change placements must be found and services must
be adjusted. Thus, barring the creation of unused excess
capacity, there will always be some number of individuals who
could be cared for in more appropriate facilities, even if only
temporarily.
Third, determining ex ante the popularity of newly
developed programs is difficult. Under a sweeping application
of Title II, states would be deterred from creating experimental
programs with limited enrollment, because such creation
provides one more option for plaintiffs to demand, claiming
that states violated the ADA by not offering the benefit to
everyone who could qualify for it. 24
Fourth, we live in a world of limited resources. Unlimited
123. See Brief for States at "1,Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999)
(No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL 60990 (discussing that individuals have widely
varying needs).
124. See discussion infra at Part II.B.3.a.
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funds, staff, and facilities are not available to care for the
country's sick. Whereas per patient costs of community care
may be lower than those of institutional care, overhead costs,
and the possibility of changing conditions suggest the
conclusion that a shift to community care might not save
money, and might in fact be quite costly."2
Fifth and finally, deinstitutionalization is not without risks,
nor is it a panacea for the ills of the mentally disabled. For some
mentally disabled individuals, institutional care can in fact be
superior to many types of community care. 6 Indeed the
experience of deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill
illustrates the need for caution. Deinstitutionalization of the
mentally ill is responsible for much of the current homeless
population and is widely regarded as a far reaching failure. 27
Samuel Brakel has written:
The deinstitutionalization movement has not lived up to its
promises and . .. the ideal of community treatment has

resulted in the abandonment of many mentally disabled
persons to virtually unsupervised, unprotected lives in
flophouses located in dangerous or dilapidated areas or even
in "psychiatric ghettoes" that have sprung up in some of our
larger cities.128
Unchecked deinstitutionalization today could have the same
effect. Closing hospitals risks putting people into communities
where they are unable to cope, and where they lack the
structured environment and monitoring of an institution. 29
125. See discussion infra at Part II.C.l.c.
126. In Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706(EBB), 1999 WL 20910
(D.Conn. Jan. 5, 1999), over 600 institutionalized individuals moved to enter a
community-care suit on the defendant's side, because of the fear that the suit
would close the institutions. Id. at *2-*3. See generally Christopher Slobogin,
Treatment of the Mentally Disabled: Rethinking the Community-First Idea, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 413 (1990) (challenging the notion that society should always favor the
current community placement over segregated institutions).
127. See generally ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT
DEINSTTUTIONALIZATION (1990) (discussing the problems of deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill); DAVID A. ROCHEFORT, FROM POORHOUSEs TO
HOMELESSNESS: POLICY ANALYSIS AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE (1993) (discussing
same); Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization,and Homelessness: A
Story of Marginalization,28 HOUS. L REV. 63, 98-108 (1991) (describing the problem
of homelessness resulting from deinstitutionalization).
128. Samuel J. Brakel, InvoluntaryInstitutionalization,in THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 31 (3d ed. 1985).
129. See EDWIN FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING
AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 11 (1997) ("For a substantial minority,
however, deinstitutionalization has been a psychiatric Titanic."); see also Olmstead
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This lack of coping ability can lead to homelessness, which can
worsen the conditions of the mentally disabled person in
addition to presenting a discrete social problem.' 0
In Alexander v. Choate,131 a Rehabilitation Act case, the
Supreme Court recognized the importance of "keep[ing] § 504
within manageable bounds." The same applies to Title II. In
light of this need for limits, the fundamental alteration and
unreasonable
modification
limitations
become
the
indispensable siblings of the Integration Regulation. While the
application of the Integration Regulation is grounded on the
supportable premise that there can be a better system, the
fundamental alteration defense is grounded on the reality that
in a world of finite resources, there can be no perfect system. A
quixotic quest for one could compound the crisis.
Given how recently the Supreme Court decided L.C. and the
relative youth of Title II jurisprudence, it is not clear what
limits the fundamental alteration principle provides. Title II
fails to provide clear guidance, and courts have yet to explore
deeply the question.3 2 Moreover, the scholarship gives the
fundamental alteration question only cursory treatment. The
possibility of an unchecked Title II raises several questions. In
response to litigation, would a state be required to
deinstitutionalize involuntarily committed and dangerous,
mentally ill individuals? Would a state be required to eliminate
its current eligibility requirements for existing treatment
programs so that more individuals would qualify? Would a
state be required to fashion entirely new programs? Would a
state be required to undertake unlimited cost to provide
integrated programs? Would a state be required to shut down
v.L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting TORREY,
supra, and noting that "the depopulation of state mental hospitals has its dark
side").
130. See Ellen Baxter & Kim Hopper, Troubled on the Streets: The Mentally
DisabledHomeless Poor,in THE CHRONIC MENTAL PATIENT: FIVE YEARS LATER 4956 (John A. Talbott ed., 1984) (describing the difficulties mentally ill individuals
face in homeless conditions).
131. 469 U.S. 287,299 (1985).
132. Cf.Brief for States at *8, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999)
(No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL 60990 ("[The 'fundamental alteration' standard
provides no criterion at all by which a state can.., plan and fund the services it
will provide to individuals with disabilities."); Lucille D. Wood, Costs and the Right
to Community-Based Treatment, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 501, 501 (1998) ("Very little
attention, however, has been paid to the way in which the costs of communitybased treatment have entered into courts' opinions.').
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all or a substantial portion of its state hospitals? The Supreme
Court's opinion in L.C. directly answers some of these
questions, but the more difficult ones are left for future cases
and controversies.
With these questions in mind, the remainder of this Article
explores the fundamental alteration defense (and the
conceptually related unreasonable modification limitation to
Title II) and attempts to do two things to promote and facilitate
discussion of the issue. First, looking back to instruct the future
(in common law fashion), Part II uses Rehabilitation Act and
ADA case law to provide advocates a practical guide to the
current arguments available. Second, using those arguments
and cases, Part II provides a theoretical framework for the
fundamental alteration and unreasonable modification
question.
II. FORWARD TO FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATION
Title HI does not require that fundamental alterations or
unreasonable modifications be made to state programs. There
is no dear test to determine whether or not a proposed
modification is unreasonable or constitutes a fundamental
alteration, and courts will look to a variety of factors to make
this largely factual determination. The issue traditionally arises
as an affirmative defense, although the issue can also arise in
the context of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Rather than
focusing on advocacy of particular positions (with frequent
exceptions), this section attempts to explain, categorize, and
place into an intellectual framework the arguments and issues
extant in community-care cases, as well as to do some casual
predicting of courts' possible resolutions of some of those
issues.
The first theoretical category of arguments presented regards
program integrity. These arguments rest on differences in kind
between the benefit offered by the public entity and the benefit
requested by the plaintiff. Where a defendant shows that a
proposed modification would alter the essential nature of a
program, by, for example, precluding the realization of
essential purposes or by eliminating essential eligibility
requirements, that modification may be deemed a fundamental
alteration. These arguments are raised in the context of three
general types of cases. First, if plaintiffs are not medically fit for
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community-based treatment of any form, then requiring
community treatment would constitute a fundamental
alteration of the state program's essential purpose of patient
33
protection assuming deference to professional discretion.1
Second, if future plaintiffs are medically fit for some form of
community treatment, but fail to meet some criteria for the
particular community treatment program requested, then
requiring release might constitute a fundamental alteration in
light of the elimination of an essential eligibility requirement,
to the extent a court does not deem the exercise of regulatory
discretion to be discriminatory. Third, if future plaintiffs satisfy
eligibility criteria for an existing community treatment plan,
but have not been transferred due to error, administrative
convenience, or a lack of available slots, then a court is less
likely to deem a required transfer to be a fundamental
alteration based on administrative discretion as an essential
feature.
The second theoretical category of arguments presented
regards magnitude. These arguments rest on changes in degree
of the public entity's system. In a large class action suit of any
of the three general types, a court may find a fundamental
alteration if the transfer of the plaintiffs would significantly
harm the fiscal well being of the state program. Further, a
fundamental alteration may be found if the requested transfer
would force broad deinstitutionalization.
A. FundamentalAlteration and Unreasonable
Modification Generally
1. Title II of the ADA Does Not Require Unreasonable
Modificationsor FundamentalAlterations
The unreasonable modification/fundamental alteration
limitation to the ADA has its roots in Supreme Court precedent
under the Rehabilitation Act. The Supreme Court held in

133. This Part discusses three types of discretion in the context of program
integrity arguments: professional discretion (respecting a treating doctor's
medical judgment), regulatory discretion (respecting the State's essential
eligibility requirements), and administrative discretion (respecting decisions made
for reasons of administrative necessity or interest). See Olmstead v. L.C. by
Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602-08 (1999) (describing limits to the State's obligations).
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Southeastern Community College v. DavisM that Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act does not require "affirmative action" on the
part of a public entity. The Davis Court held that requiring a
nursing school to accommodate a deaf student, including
providing individualized assistance, would amount to a
"fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program... far
more than the 'modification' [Section 504] requires." 3 5
Subsequently, in Alexander v. Choate,3 6 the Court interpreted
the "affirmative action" discussed in Davis to mean those
modifications that would be "substantial" or those that "would
constitute fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of a
program." Under this newly formulated fundamental-alteration
defense, the Choate Court held that a state was not precluded
from reducing the number of hospital days that Medicaid
would reimburse hospitals on behalf of Medicaid recipients,
even though this funding decision dispro-portionately affected
disabled individuals. 3 7
The fundamental alteration defense, as an extension of the
principle that the ADA requires only reasonable modifications,
has been expressly recognized by DOJ regulation. Furthermore,
the regulation has been applied in the context of Integration
Regulation cases under Title 11.138 The regulation does not
clearly define what sorts of changes would be deemed
fundamental, nor do the regulations provide further guidance
on the elements of the fundamental alteration defense.
Likewise, in neither Davis nor Choate did the Supreme Court
clarify the bounds of what constituted a fundamental
alteration, except to say that "substantial" changes were not
required. 1 39 Herein lies the problem. Defining "fundamental"
alterations as those changes that are "substantial" brings to
mind the proverbial Push and Shove Dictionary, under which
the definition of "Push" is "shove," and the definition of
"Shove" is "push."140 The discussion below uses ADA case law
134. 442 U.S. 397,411 (1979).
135. Id. at 410.
136. 469 U.S. 287,300-01 n.20 (1984) (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 413,410).

137. Id. at 302-03.
138. See, e.g., L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 904 (11th Cir. 1998).
139. Choate, 469 U.S. at 301 n.20.
140. The authors' knowledge of this "proverb" is owed to the father of coauthor Jefferson Smith, R.P. Joe Smith. As a rural district attorney in Umatilla
County, Oregon, Mr. Smith used the saying to lament the circularity of the
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to posit possible principles to define the term and break the
circularity.
2. FactualInquiry Without a Clear Test
Law under Title II of the ADA is still developing,141 and
before Olmstead v. L. C. no clear test had emerged for whether or
not a modification would be held unreasonable or a
fundamental alteration. Courts have looked to a wide variety
of factors. Factors that courts have considered are discussed
below as they might apply to a defendant in a suit claiming
community care.
Whether a proposed modification constitutes a fundamental
alteration is a fact-intensive determination.'" The necessity for
a factual context to determine the reasonableness of a
modification under Title II parallels Rehabilitation Act
principles. 45 The factual nature of the fundamental alteration
inquiry suggests two conclusions germane to advocates. First,
specific cases might produce widely varying results, given the
potential for different factual records and the possible leeway
accorded fact finders. Second, the fact intensive nature of the
inquiry may increase the expense of litigation. Not only will
investigation and analysis of facts require resources, but courts
may also be reluctant to resolve cases quickly in the
defendant's favor by means of summary judgment.'46
arguments of defense attorneys.
141. See, e.g., Heather K. v. City of Mallard, 946 F. Supp. 1373, 1383 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (noting that "there is still very little case law interpreting Title II of the
ADA").
142. See, e.g., DeBord v. Bd. of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist., 126 F.3d
1102, 1106 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that "there is no precise reasonableness test").
143. See discussion infra at Part II.B.
144. See L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 (11th Cir. 1998)
(remanding for specific findings of fact); Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 304-05 (3d
Cir. 1994) (creating a fact intensive inquiry to determine whether the modification
was reasonable); see also William Christian, Normalization as a Goal: The Americans
with DisabilitiesAct and Individuals with Mental Retardation,73 TEX. L. REV. 409, 43536 (1994) ("[Tlhe 'undue burden' or 'fundamental alterations' defenses ... have
always required subjective inquiries to balance the particular equities of a given
situation.").
145. See Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Penn., 926 F.2d 1368, 1385, 1392 (3d Cir.
1991) ("What is to be considered to be a 'reasonable accommodation' of course
must be decided on a case-by-case basis."). The court reversed summary judgment
for the defendant on the issue of whether a medical school was required to make
accommodation for a handicapped student. Id. at 1386,1392.
146. See, e.g., Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706(EBB), 1999
WL 20910, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 5,1999) (refusing to grant summary judgment in a
large class action suit because several factual questions remained); HeatherK., 946
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Arises as Affirmative Defense or Within Plaintiff's
PrimaFacie Case

The issue of fundamental alteration typically arises as an
affirmative defense whereby the public entity defendant
attempts to resist modification of an existing program despite
plaintiff's showing that the program was discriminatory. 4 7 For
example, before L.C. reached the Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing
of unlawful discrimination, including a general showing that
requiring community care was a reasonable modification "in
the run of cases."' 48 The appellate court then remanded to the
trial court to make a specific determination of whether the
defendant fulfilled its burden of proving that the provision of
community care would "fundamentally alter" the service it
provides. 4 9 Treating the fundamental alteration issue as an
affirmative defense comports with the traditional treatment of
other provisions of the ADA. 50

However, some courts have raised the issue of fundamental
alteration in the context of determining whether the plaintiff
has made a prima facie showing that a proposed modification
is generally reasonable in the run of cases.' 5 ' While potentially
F. Supp. at 1389 (holding that the "reasonableness of proposed modifications is
generally a fact question not amenable to summary judgment") (citing Crowder v.
Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1485-87 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that application of an
animal quarantine on seeing eye dogs could potentially violate the ADA, but
finding that the question of reasonableness of modifications was a fact intensive
inquiry not appropriate for determination on summary judgment)).
147. See, e.g., Zukle v. Regents of UC, 166 F.3d 1041, 1046-47, 1050-51 (9th Cir.
1999) (describing and adopting the burden-shifting rule under Title II and holding
that a medical school did not need to lower standards substantially to
accommodate a learning disabled student).
148. L.C., 138 F.3d at 904 (quoting Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1993)).
149. Id. at 904-05 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2000)).
150. Under the communications provisions of Title II, "a public entity has the
burden of proving that compliance . . . would result in [a fundamental]
alteration . . . ." 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (2000); see also Anne B. Thomas, Beyond the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Title II of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 22 N.M. L.
REV. 243, 255 (1992) (discussing the "fundamental alteration and undue financial
and administrative burdens standards" of 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (2000)). Further,
treating fundamental alteration as an affirmative defense comports with Titles I
and III. Under Titles I and III, the plaintiff must make a showing that "the
requested modification is reasonable in the general sense, that is, reasonable in the
run of the cases." Johnson v. Gambrinus Co., 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997).
The burden then shifts to the defendant, who must show that the requested
modification would constitute a fundamental alteration in light of "the specifics of
the plaintiff's or defendant's circumstances." Id. at 1059-60.
151. See, e.g., Greist v. Norristown State Hosp., No. CIv.A.96-CV-8495,1997 WL
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confusing, the divergent treatment of the burden issue can be
reconciled and need not be interpreted as a split among courts.
Title II requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the possibility of a
reasonable accommodation or modification, and courts have
defined "reasonableness" to exclude that which would require
a fundamental alteration.'52 Thus, the issue of fundamental
alteration might arise in two contexts. First, the issue might
arise in the course of arguing that the proposed modification or
accommodation is generally unreasonable "in the run of the
cases" and thus that the defendant's failure to make them did
not constitute discrimination. Indeed, for the most part the
arguments raised below could just as well serve a claim that
proposed modifications were "unreasonable."" 3 Second, even if
the plaintiff makes such a prima facie showing of
discrimination, the defendant may still argue as an affirmative

defense that the modification constitutes a fundamental
alteration in light of specific facts.
B. Analysis of ProgramIntegrity Arguments in the
Context of Three Ideal Types

This section has a Janus-like mission; it attempts not only to
describe the past but also to use the past with a view to the
14
future-much like the progression of the common law itself.'
661097, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997) (considering the issue of fundamental
alteration in dismissing the plaintiff's prima facie case); Heather K. v. City of
Mallard, 946 F. Supp. 1373, 1388 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("[A] modification that would
'fundamentally' alter or change a program or policy is not a 'reasonable
modification.'") (quoting Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026,
1037 (6th Cir. 1995)).
152. See, e.g., DeBord v. Bd. of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant, 126 F.3d 1102,1106
(8th Cir. 1997) ("[A]n accommodation is unreasonable if it either imposes undue
financial or administrative burdens, or requires a fundamental alteration in the
nature of the program." (citations omitted)); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n., 119 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding accommodation to be
unreasonable if it imposes undue financial burden or "require[s] a fundamental
alteration in the nature of [the] program" (quoting Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 486 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987))); Aughe v. Shalala, 885 F. Supp. 1428,1432-33
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (finding same).
153. The fundamental alteration/reasonable accommodation inquiry is best
seen as just a part of the more general discrimination inquiry. By this view, the
ADA does not proclaim that an entity may discriminate if to avoidit would entail
an unreasonable accommodation. Rather, under this view, the ADA declares: an
entity that fails to make a reasonable accommodation is by definition
discriminating.
154. Karl Llewellyn tells us that stare decisis is "Janus-faced." KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURE ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 74 (1930);
see also Karl N. Llewellyn, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
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Addressing future potential legal controversies is inherently
difficult, which might partly account for the dearth of
scholarship that explicitly intends to inform advocates and
judges of how to deal with future cases.
This paper attempts to negotiate the difficulty by referring to
55
"ideal types," as described by German scholar Max Weber.'
An "ideal type" creates a model of thought by abstracting and
summarizing the core features of complex, empirical
phenomena, and it combines, clarifies, and emphasizes the
most important of these. The ideal type itself need not
necessarily exist anywhere in reality, but thinking in and
communicating by way of such ideal types can assist
understanding and coping with complex reality. Essentially,
the tool allows this paper to explore future cases -and thereby
help legal practitioners-while still maintaining academic rigor
and avoiding undue speculation. Nonetheless, it is important
to bear in mind that no ideal type can substitute for an analysis
of the meaning and the approximate actual significance of each
element. Put simply, the foregoing is intended to be helpful
rather than definitive-a compass, not a map.
1. Plaintiffs Who Are Medically Unfitfor Community Treatment
In a case brought by plaintiffs who seek community-based
care but who are not medically fit for it, requiring community
care would constitute a fundamental alteration of the state
program and would not be required by ADA Title II. One of
the essential purposes of institutional care is protecting the
institutionalized individual, and requiring release to that
individual's own detriment would make the essential purpose
impossible to accomplish, thus constituting a fundamental
CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 183, 189 (1941) (remarking that the

American legal tradition is "equipped with a whole set of Janus-faced
techniques").
155. For more on Weberian ideal types, see MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND
SOCIErY 19-22 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephriam Fischoff et al. trans.
1978); James Bohmap, Weber, Max, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY

848-49 (Robert Audi ed., 1995) (describing "Weberian ideal types"); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 5 n.21 (1997) ("Although not perfectly reflected in reality, ideal types can
be approached or approximated.'. Much of this paper's textual discussion on the
subject is borrowed from the excellent, lucid, and brief discussion by Gunther A.
Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L.

435,455 (2000).
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alteration that is not required by Title 11.156 But one issue
remains: the extent to which the judgments of the institution's
or the state's professionals must be granted deference.
a. EssentialNature and ProgramIntegrity Generally
The ADA does not require alteration of the essential nature
of a program, and changing the essential nature of a program
can constitute a fundamental alteration.'57 The essential nature
concept originated in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis.'58 The Court held that
the ability to hear a patient's speech was "necessary" and
"indispensable" to a nurse's functioning.'
The Court
determined that the hearing impaired plaintiff would not
receive even a "rough equivalent of the training a nursing
program normally gives." 160 The Court went on to announce
that such a "fundamental alteration" was not required.' 6'
Arguing that a proposed modification is an unreasonable
modification or a fundamental alteration because it would alter
the essential nature of a program or eliminate an essential
feature is admittedly circular, but it highlights the presence of a
class of arguments that this discussion dubs "programintegrity"
arguments. 62 These program integrity arguments can be seen
as resting on differences of kind, as distinct from differences of
156. Further, the Integration Regulation only requires the most integrated care
"appropriate," and thus provides that inappropriate care should not be required
even absent a fundamental alteration argument. Still, the following discussion
illustrates the issues of fundamental alteration generally.
157. See, e.g., Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297,302 (3d Cir. 1994) (allowing plaintiffs
to receive community care only if it would not change the "essential nature" of the
program); cf.Tugg v. Towey, 864 F. Supp. 1201, 1210 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding in a
Title III case that requiring a mental health agency to hire a counselor adept in
sign language would not alter the "essential nature" of mental health counseling,
and thus would not constitute a "fundamental alteration").
158. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). Cases of inclusion/exclusion in a benefit provided to
everyone, such as nursing school, require a different application than cases
concerning institution/integration uniquely needed by the disabled. Compare id.
at 162 (holding inclusion ineffectual where individual unable to perform
necessary duties), with Greist v. Norristown State Hosp., No. CIV. A. 96-CV-8495,
1997 WL 661097, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997) (denying integration where
individual dangerous and unqualified for out-patient treatment).
159. Davis,442 U.S. at 407.
160. Id. at 410.
161. Id.
162- See Wood, supra note 132, at 523 (dividing the defenses under the ADA
into "cost" and "integrity" notions and arguing that costs should be considered in
community-care cases).
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degree.'63 For example, a police department may not be
required to hire a police officer who cannot effect a forcible
arrest, because effecting a forcible arrest is an essential function
of police work."M Likewise, a museum is not required to
accommodate blind patrons by eliminating or waiving a policy
against touching the artwork, because protecting artwork is an
essential feature of a museum. 6 5 Viewed another way, the
benefit provided by the museum is the viewing of artwork, not
the touching of it, and requiring touching is a fundamental
alteration of this intended benefit. The defense in these contexts
rests not on the cost or level of burden to the entity, but simply
on the nature of the benefit granted by the entity and its
difference with the nature of the requested accommodation.
b.

EssentialPurposes

Concerning the ideal-type case in which the patient is not
deemed to be medically fit for community treatment, a
defendant can apply a program integrity argument and
maintain that protection of institutionalized individuals is an
essential purpose the elimination of which would constitute a
fundamental alteration, thus precluding Title II from requiring
the provision of community care. Precluding the realization of
an essential purpose can constitute a fundamental alteration.
For example, in Davis, "the purpose of [the nursing] program"
was to train nurses in many skills, and allowing hearing
impaired students would frustrate that purpose. 6 6
Greist v. Norristown State Hospital6 7 provides an example of a
case in which a fundamental alteration was found because the
individual was unfit for community care. In Greist, a federal
district court held that Title II did not require the release into
163. Of course, at some point differences in kind dovetail with differences in
degree, and vice-versa.
164. See Davoll v. Webb, 943 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Colo. 1996) (holding that a police
department need not rehire a disabled police officer).
165. See 28 C.F.R. § 36 App. B at 643 (2000) (noting that "[d]amage to the
museum piece would clearly be a fundamental alteration" under the rules
regarding places of public accommodation under Title II and III).
166. Davis, 442 U.S. at 413.
167. No. CIV.A.96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997); ef Jeffrey
v. St. Clair, 933 F. Supp. 963 (D. Haw. 1996) (holding that involuntarily committed
hospital patients were not discriminated against on the basis of their disability
merely because they were placed in a more restrictive setting after their residential
program was closed).
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the community of a particular mental patient.' 8 After a brutal
incident in 1978, Richard Greist had been involuntarily
committed to Norristown State Hospital after being found not
guilty of murder by reason of insanity.16 9 In 1996, the staff
psychiatrist at Norristown determined that Greist still posed a
danger to others and required further inpatient treatment, and
Greist brought suit under Title II of the ADA to demand a
transfer to community facilities. 170 However, the court held that
"[t]o require state courts to release such individuals into the
community would fundamentally alter the nature of
Pennsylvania's involuntary commitment program by making
an essential purpose of the program-protecting the
community-impossible to accomplish."' Thus, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state an
ADA claim.' 72
The Greist case can be distinguished on its facts from the bulk
of other cases; many developmentally disabled or mentally ill
individuals will not be dangerous to the community, and many
patients are not involuntarily committed. Still, prospective
plaintiffs under Title II may be dangerous to themselves, and an
institution may provide such individuals with necessary care.
Under the broader principle illustrated by Greist-that
eliminating essential purposes is a fundamental alterationreleasing individuals who require institutional care would
thwart the essential purpose of patient protection.
Commentators have suggested that effective institutions are
better suited than community programs for treating the
severely disabled, because institutions provide a more
supervised and structured environment.' 73 People who enter
institutions are often dangerous to themselves or are gravely
disabled. 74 Institutions provide monitoring, structure, and
support, and this function of institutions-"total responsibility
168. Greist,1997 WL 661097, at *4.
169. See id. at "1. In 1978, Greist stabbed his grandmother, removed the eye of
his daughter, and killed his wife and unborn child. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id. at *4.
172 Id.
173. See Bessette, supra note 38, at 163 (reviewing the scholarship and arguing in
favor of community care for less severely disabled individuals).
174 See JOHN PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 57 (A.B.A. Comm'n Mental &
Physical Disability ed., 5th ed. 1995).
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75
for patient care"-is missing in typical community programs.
Institutionalization advocates argue that "an effective
institution is more able to meet the needs of those who are
seriously ill.""' 6 For seriously disabled people, "without the
coercive structure of the hospital, there is no way to assure that
basic human services will be provided through either formal or
informal means."'7"
Indeed, efforts have been made on behalf of some severely
disabled individuals to resist deinstitutionalization. In a
California case, a staff physician was fired after allegedly
criticizing the manner in which community care was being
offered."7' That physician, Dr. William Cable, contended that
severely disabled people were being transferred into the
community, resulting in high morbidity and mortality rates." 9
In Messier v. Southbury Training School,180 an ongoing
community-care class action suit in Connecticut, 618 residents
of Southbury moved to intervene on the side of the defendants
because they feared that community placements would be
imposed. Where individuals are not suited for community care,
imposing such care would eliminate an essential purpose of the
state's program, and thus constitute a fundamental alteration.
This view, later embraced by the Supreme Court,' was
foreshadowed by principles announced by pre-L.C opinions in
the Third Circuit. In Easley v. Snider,8 2 the Third Circuit held
that plaintiffs had no Title II claim for community care where
plaintiffs were not mentally alert, because requiring such care
would change the "essential nature" of the program. Moreover,
the Third Circuit's decision in Helen L. required the
deinstitutionalization only in light of the stipulation by both

175. JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM 105 (1992).
176. John Martin, Deinstitutionalization:What Will It Really Cost?, SCHIZOPHRENIA

DIG., Apr. 1995, at 12 (quoted in Bessette, supra note 38, at 168).
177. LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 175, at 105.
178. Cable v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 973 F. Supp. 937 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(holding that plaintiff physician had stated a claim for retaliatory termination
under the ADA).
179. See id. at 939.
180. No. 3:94-CV-1706, 1999 WL 20910, at *2-*3 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 1999)
(describing the procedural history of the five year old class action, in which two
motions to intervene were denied, and denying cross motions for summary
judgment).
181. See Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 601-02 (1999).
182. 36 F.3d 297,304 (1994).
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sides that community care was medically appropriate. 83 The
Helen L. court held that the provision of community care would
not constitute a fundamental alteration because such a
modification would not alter the program's "requirements" or
its "substance." Requiring release of individuals who were not
medically fit for community care, however, would manifestly
change the substance of the state program. Thus, public entity
defendants supporting continued institutional care would
almost certainly prevail in a suit against plaintiffs who required
institutionalization for reasons of treatment.
The Supreme Court's opinion in L.C. reflects this notion that
the ADA does not mandate releasing patients who require
institutional care. In L. C., the Supreme Court held "that nothing
in the ADA or its implementing regulations condones
termination of institutional settings for persons unable to
handle or benefit from community settings.' 84 Although there
is still substantial room to argue which persons are "unable to
handle or benefit from community settings, 18 5 and the L.C,
opinion still begs the question of what states must do if they
have been lax in creating programs that potential plaintiffs
would be able to "handle" and "benefit" from,'86 the Supreme
Court's opinion squarely preserves and emphasizes the
essential purpose arguments that were earlier announced and
exemplified by Greist,Easley, and Helen L.
c.

The Limitation of ReasonableProfessionalDiscretion

Potential remaining problems with the foregoing rule
warrants mention. Where a professional judgment is not
reasonable with regard to a determination of a disabled
individual's fitness for community treatment, a court might not
defer to that judgment. For example, in Kathleen S., a subclass
consisting of sixty-eight individuals had been evaluated and
deemed unfit for community treatment. 87 However, the State
183. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,328 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The parties agree that,
although Idell S. is not capable of fully independent living, she is not so
incapacitated that she needs the custodial care of a nursing home.").
184. L.C., 527 U.S. at 601-602.
185. Id. This question, however, will be one for a battle of the experts, rather
than a battle of the administrators and accountants.
186. Id.
18Z Kathleen S.v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(discussed infra at Part II.B.3.a.).
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stipulated at the time of litigation that several members of the
subclass were fit for community care, and there was a diversity
of opinion among experts with regard to the designations of
several others.188 In response to the misdiagnoses, the court
refused to defer to the previous judgments regarding fitness,
ordering independent evaluations for all members of the
subclass and holding further that those individuals determined
by the independent evaluator to be fit for community care must
89
be provided such care.'
This portion of Kathleen S. illustrates two things. First, the
program integrity arguments in this general type of case
depend in part on the extent to which courts defer to
professional discretion. Second, deference to such professional
judgment discretion depends on whether it is exercised
reasonably. Where a judgment is patently false, or where it
serves as a mere cloak for discrimination or administrative
convenience, deference for professional judgment is unlikely.190
However, given the Supreme Court's opinion in L.C. and the
traditional deference granted to the decisions of state
professionals,' 9' this portion of Kathleen S. may rarely be
applicable, and potential controversies remain after L.C.
Indeed, the DOJ view provides that community care is required
only if the "State's treatment professionals have determined, in
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" that it is
appropriate. 92 To the extent that the State's professionals differ

188. Id.
189. Id. at 474-75.
190. Cf Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D. Md. 1996) ("The
[State] defense experts' opinions are not, however, conclusive on the issue of
professional judgment."). But cf Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV1706(EBB), 1999 WL 20910, at *13 (D. Conn.Jan. 5,1999) (relying on the judgment
of the state treating professionals). Of course, what is reasonable is another issue
for debate and will no doubt be subject to the Janus-faced development of the law.
191. See, e.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (concluding
professional judgment governs in the constitutional context unless unreasonable);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (observing the proper standard for
determining whether a state has protected constitutional rights is whether
reasonable professional judgment was exercised); Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp.,
964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting the Due Procqss Clause requires that states
ensure professional judgment is exercised in care and training decisions).
192. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at *5
n.1, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat 1999
WL 149653 (emphasis added); accord Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,
607 (1999) (noting that community-based treatment is required only "when the
State's treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate").
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in judgment from other professionals-such as independent
doctors hired by families or advocates of mentally handicapped
people-and to the extent courts defer to the State's treatment
professionals, issues like those raised by Kathleen S. retain their
relevance.
2. Plaintiffs Who May be Medically Fitfor Some Type of
Community Treatment, but Who Fail To Meet Requirementsfor the
State Community-CareProgram
a. EliminatingEssentialEligibilityRequirements Can Constitute a
FundamentalAlteration

In a case brought by plaintiffs who seek some type of
community care for which they are medically fit, but who do
not fulfill the state program's eligibility requirements, a court
might find that requiring a shift to community care would
constitute an unreasonable modification or a fundamental
alteration. The success or failure of this argument may depend
on the extent to which a court deems the criteria essential,
traditionally non-waivable, and non-discriminatory. Of the
three ideal types addressed, this type presents the most
potential for controversy.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Davis supports the
proposition that eliminating essential standards for eligibility
constitutes a fundamental alteration. In the course of
determining that a fundamental alteration of a nursing
program was not required, the Court wrote that Section 504
imposes no requirement "to lower or to effect substantial
modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped
person."' g3 Moreover, the ADA provides that "[q]ualified
individuals" under the statute are those that fulfill "essential
eligibility requirements." 9 a Citing that provision, the Supreme
Court in L.C. acknowledged that the provision of community
care was limited to those individuals who fulfilled "essential
eligibility requirements," but did not elucidate what may
constitute such a requirement. 95
193. S.E. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,413 (1979).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000).
195. L.C., 527 U.S. at 602 ("[T]he State generally may rely on the reasonable
assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an individual 'meets
the essential eligibility requirements' for habilitation in a community setting.").
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Courts outside the community-care context have respected
program integrity and held that elimination of essential
eligibility requirements for a public program constitutes a
fundamental alteration. The Sixth Circuit in McPherson v.
Michigan High School Athletic Association'9 6 held that maximum
age and semester requirements for participation in high school
sports need not be waived for learning disabled students under
Title II. The court held that forcing a waiver of an eight
semester rule for a learning disabled child would "work a
fundamental alteration in the Michigan high school sports
programs."' 9 The McPherson court reasoned that the rule was a
necessary eligibility requirement that contributed to
maintaining safety and competitiveness. 198 Additionally, a
federal district court in the State of Washington held that
waiver of an "essential" Medicaid plan eligibility requirement
was not required where waiver would impose an undue
financial burden or would "fundamentally alter the nature of
the program."' 99 The plaintiffs argued that waiving the
a
be
would
requirement
graduation-by-age-nineteen
the
Rather,
reasonable modification, but the court disagreed.
court held that the requirement was an "essential" one that
need not be waived.2 °0 By deferring to the eligibility
requirements, these courts can be viewed as effectively
deferring to the regulatorydiscretion of the programs' framers allowing the creators of the programs to define the benefit
offered, and respecting the limits of that benefit.2a '
This manner of program integrity argument can be applied
to the community-care context. If a defendant state program
has specific standards for admission into its attendant care
196. 119 F.3d 453,462 (6th Cir. 1997).
197. Id.
198. Id.; see also Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 103637 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that age requirement for participation in sports was
"necessary" and that waiver would "fundamentally change" the bright line age
restriction).
199. Aughe v. Shalala, 885 F. Supp. 1428,1432-33 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (citing Sch.
Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987)).
200. Id. at 1430,1432-33.
201. This line of reasoning is quite similar to the judiciary's method for
evaluating claims of gender discrimination-that is, the effect of discrimination is
rarely determinative where there is no intent to classify by gender. See, e.g.,
Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 650-52 (8th Cir. 1996) (demonstrating disparate
impact does not violate the Equal Protection Clause where the challenged policy is
facially neutral and there is no discriminatory intent).
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program, then plaintiffs who do not fulfill those requirements
may fail in an attempt to modify those requirements. For
instance, if a public entity required that applicants to its
community-care program meet certain self-sufficiency criteria
then, in response to a challenge by non-self-sufficient
applicants the public entity might argue that those
requirements were at least as essential as an age requirement in
sports or a graduation requirement for receipt of federal
benefits. Thus, requiring waiver would be an unreasonable
modification or a fundamental alteration of the communitycare program. The Third Circuit's holding in Helen L. would
not cut against an essential eligibility requirements
argument.20 2 In Helen L., the plaintiff fulfilled all eligibility
requirements for the state community-care program, and the
failure to place her in the appropriate program was based
simply on a budgetary mechanism.'u 3

The paradigmatic community-care case respecting eligibility
2
requirements is the Third Circuit' s opinion in Easley v. Snider. 0.
In Easley, two severely disabled institutionalized persons
brought a Title II challenge to the state requirement that that
they be mentally alert in order to participate in the State's
attendant care program.2 5 The court rejected the claim. The
first plaintiff, Tracey Easley, was paralyzed in a car accident
and could not speak. The second plaintiff, Florence Howard,
suffered from multiple sclerosis and undifferentiated
schizophrenia.2 6 The State's attendant care program required
that applicants be sufficiently mentally alert (1) to select,
supervise, and fire an attendant; and (2) to manage their own
financial affairs. 20 7 Both Easley and Howard failed these

criteria, both were rejected, and both sued.
At issue in the case was whether the mental alertness
eligibility requirement was part of the essential nature of the
program, such that the ADA would not require its
elimination.2 8 The court relied on the State's definition of the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
2O7.
208.

Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 329.
36 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 299.
Id.
Id. at 300.
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benefit, and held that the program endeavored to provide
independence and to enable the disabled to procure
employment. 9 The court determined that personal control of
the attendant, and therefore the mental alertness sufficient to
exercise that control, was an essential dimension of the state
program without which its objectives could not be realized.
Easley and Howard argued that they could receive the benefits
of the attendant care program with the assistance of surrogate
decisionmakers, and that the ADA demanded this
accommodation.2 0 However, the court rejected their argument:
"[T]he use of surrogates, would, at the very least, change the
entire focus of the program ....

The proposed alteration would

create a program that the State never envisioned.... " 21 Thus,
the court deferred to regulatory discretion and did not impose
the requested accommodation.
b. Determining Whether or Not an EligibilityRequirementIs
"Essential"May Turn on the Agency s History of Granting Waivers

If a state agency is accustomed to making waivers of its
eligibility requirements for release into community care for
people situated similarly to the prospective plaintiffs, then
requiring such waivers for the prospective plaintiffs might not
constitute a fundamental alteration. Previous waivers may
suggest that the eligibility requirement in question is not in fact
"essential." The district court in Williams v. Wasserman212
expressed the view that a history of providing care for similarly
situated individuals weakened a claim of fundamental
twelve
institutionalized,
Wasserman,
alteration.
In
developmentally disabled, and traumatically brain injured
plaintiffs sought community-care placements that had
allegedly been recommended by their treating physicians.213 In
response to the defendants' arguments that community
transfers would be unreasonable, the court noted that the State
had recently approved community-treatment slots for several
of the plaintiffs. The court wrote that "[t]hese placements
indicate that what the plaintiffs seek is not a 'fundamental
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 303.
Id. at 304.
Id. at305.
937 F. Supp. 524,528 (D. Md. 1996).
Id. at526.
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alteration.' 214
Similarly, in Tatum v. NCAA, 215 a district court indicated 'that
an accommodation does not constitute a fundamental
alteration under Title III of the ADA where there is a history of
such accommodations. The Tatum court held that the NCAA's
failure to allow the plaintiff to take the college entrance
examination under untimed conditions did not constitute
discrimination under Title III, because the disability itself was
not sufficiently substantiated. The court noted, however, that in
the case of a properly substantiated disability, "the acceptanice
of untimed tests would not fundamentally alter the nature of
the NCAA eligibility criteria in the case
of a confirmed
216
disability with a history of accommodations."
There are two reasons Wasserman and Tatum may fail to be
influential precedent. First, in Wasserman, the court found no
eligibility requirements that the plaintiff failed to fulfill.
Second, the Tatum dictum arose under Title III outside the
context of a community-care case, and a given eligibility
requirement may be more essential for a community-care
program than a test-taking protocol is for athletics. Still, the
principle survives and may be persuasive. A history of
granting waivers would appear to cut against the assertion that
an eligibility requirement is "essential," so requiring further
waivers may not effect a fundamental alteration.
The matter does not end there. To counter the contention that
a history of waivers indicates that an eligibility requirement is
not essential, defendants first might argue that while occasional
waivers have been allowed, requiring waivers would open the
floodgates to further waivers, thus effecting a fundamental
alteration of the state program. The cost of considering large
numbers of waiver applications and the magnitude of the
change presented by the increased number of granted waivers
might constitute an unreasonable modification or a
fundamental alteration even where a few waivers might not.
This very argument motivated the McPherson court decision
not to require waivers for participation in high school

214. Id. at528.
215. 992 F. Supp. 1114,1123 n.5 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
216. Id. (emphasis added).
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athletics. 2 17 Moreover, defendants might argue that the current
system of granting waivers is itself an essential feature, because
the system allows the agency experts to make decisions in a
manner that best serves the disabled community as well as the
particular disabled individuals. In essence, defendants would
rely not on regulatory discretion (the power to define the
program) but on administrative discretion (the power to
implement the program). As discussed below at Part II.A.2.c, a
court should not allow discretion qua discretion to constitute
an essential feature, because this could grant a license to
discriminate.
c.

DiscriminatoryRequirements or PurposesShould Not Be
Deemed Essential

Where a court deems a program eligibility requirement or
purpose to be discriminatory, it should extend Wasserman and
Tatum by requiring that states eliminate policies that
intentionally discriminate among equally functional people,
and by refusing to find that the elimination of that feature
constitutes a fundamental alteration. At least two courts have
done so. In Helen L., the Third Circuit held that elimination of a
discriminatory funding mechanism did not constitute a
fundamental alteration. 8 The court noted that the state agency
"cannot rely upon a funding mechanism of the General
Assembly to justify administering its attendant care program in
a manner that discriminates and then argue that it can not
comply with the ADA without fundamentally altering its
program."21 9 In Doe v. Stincer,2 20 a district court refused to allow
the fundamental alteration defense to save a statutory scheme
whereby patients with mental or emotional conditions could
not access their medical records. The court held that the scheme
was not saved by the fundamental alteration defense, given
that the entire scheme discriminated against all patients
receiving treatment for a mental condition. z ' Bolstering that
217. McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 462-63 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding that waiver of maximum semester eligibility requirement would
risk "opening the floodgates for waivers," which would increase the cost of
making assessments as well as increase the risk of doing so incorrectly).
218. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,338 (3d Cir. 1995).
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. 990 F. Supp. 1427,1433 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
221. Id.
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argument is a regulation issued by the DOJ pursuant to ADA
Title II: "A public entity may not... utilize criteria or methods
of administration... that have the effect of subjecting qualified
individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of
disability ....'
When examining the most discriminatory rules, the
argument that eliminating a discriminatory feature does not
constitute a fundamental alteration is particularly convincing.
A court would presumably not preserve a state program that
locked developmentally disabled individuals in underground
bunkers for the express purpose of shielding them from view.
Likewise, a court would be unlikely to preserve a program that
allowed the release 'of institutionalized individuals into
integrated settings only on the condition that those individuals
appear to the untrained eye to be non-disabled. Even though
destroying the bunkers would eliminate the stated purpose of
segregation, and even though modifying the "untrained eye"
program would eliminate the eligibility requirement of
physical appearance, a court would seem unlikely to deem
those features "essential" or their elimination "fundamental"
alterations.'
In short, a court likely would prohibit
discriminatory criteria when the stated criteria is a obvious
sham used to justify discriminatory treatment. The interesting
question is, how obvious does the discriminatory intent have to
be before the courts will prohibit the use of the stated criteria?
To the extent that a court may embrace the notion that
discriminatory features are not "essential," defendants should
222. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3) (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2000) ("A
public entity shall not . . . apply eligibility requirements that screen out . ..
individual[s] with a disability from fully enjoying any service program or activity,
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service,
program, or activity being offered."); cf Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir.
1994) ("A court cannot rely solely on the stated benefits because programs may
attempt to define the benefit in a way that 'effectively denies otherwise
handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled.'"
(quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,301 (1985))).
223. At least one commentator has argued that the defenses under the ADA
should not apply in full force in the context of intentional discrimination. See
Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health Treatment in
Publicly FinancedHealth Care, 40 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 315, 341-43 (1996). Further, at
least one court has held that eligibility criteria could not be based on overbroad
generalizations about the handicapped. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo.,
658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that under the Rehabilitation Act a medical
school may not deny admission based on general assumptions about the effects of
multiple sclerosis on the individual applicant).
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frame their fundamental alteration defenses in terms of
features that are less likely to be deemed discriminatory. A
segregative purpose whose essential nature is the advancement
of segregation itself is likely to be deemed discriminatory.
Further, an arbitrary funding mechanism (as in Helen L.) or an
arbitrary organizational mechanism (such as unnecessary
institutionalization) may be deemed discriminatory. On the
other hand, preserving patient safety, protecting facility
viability, or facilitating patient care may be less likely to be
deemed discriminatory, and thus the elimination of those
features may more likely constitute a fundamental alteration.
At the very least, this suggests advocacy advice: Presumably a
court would be more likely to deem "essential" a feature that
seemed to aid the disabled than a feature that seemed
intentionally discriminatory or an arbitrary vestige of
traditional discriminatory practices.
d. A Creative Court Could Shrink the Fundamental
Alteration Defense
A creative court could wield two arguments to shrink the
ambit of the reasonable modification limitation to Title II,
thereby enlarging Title Ws application. First, a creative court
might broaden the foregoing "discriminatory requirement"
exception and hold that any requirement that prevented
medically qualified individuals from receiving the most
integrated care appropriate would constitute a discriminatory
or nonessential eligibility requirement. The argument would
proceed as follows: If (1) the elimination of discriminatory
eligibility requirements does not constitute a fundamental
alteration; and if (2) the Integration Regulation indicates that
unnecessary segregation constitutes discrimination; then (3)
any eligibility requirement that caused medically unnecessary
segregation would be discriminatory; and thus (4) waiver or
elimination of such an eligibility requirement would not
constitute a fundamental alteration. Second, essentially the
same argument can be framed another way: Rather than
asserting that the community-care program unlawfully
discriminated (the position rejected by Easley), a court could
find that the entire care program unlawfully discriminated-by
creating criteria that kept individuals in institutions
unnecessarily.
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For these propositions, a court could loosely cite L.C., which
holds that unnecessary segregation violates Title I.
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in L.C. did not
expressly rely on the plaintiff's eligibility under the State's own
requirements (as the Third Circuit did in Helen L.) but merely
held broadly that Title II requires care in the most integrated
manner medically appropriate. 4 The "discriminatory
requirement" arguments above would both suggest an
opposite result in Easley. Arguably the most integrated setting
appropriate for the plaintiffs in Easley was attendant care,
either with or without the added assistance of surrogates. 2- If
the mental alertness requirement could be satisfied by the most
integrated care appropriate to their medical needs, then that
requirement could not be deemed essential, and thus its
elimination or waiver would not constitute an unreasonable
accommodation or fundamental alteration. Viewed in the
second frame, the entire state program would have committed
unlawful discrimination by creating an overall system that
caused unnecessary segregation. In these ways, a court could
shrink the fundamental alteration defense and thereby enlarge
the application of Title II.
Three arguments could counter the broadening of the
"discriminatory requirement" exception. First and foremost, the
language of the Supreme Court's L.C. opinion gives states
significant leeway and specifically provides that the integration
mandate be limited to situations that "can be reasonably
accommodated."" 6 Moreover, nothing in the L. C. case indicates
that the plaintiffs failed to meet state eligibility requirements;
indeed, L.C. herself was put in a community placement before
judgment was ever entered. 7 Thus, nothing in the opinion
requires that a court disregard eligibility requirements.
Second, if a court were to accept the aforementioned
"shrinking" arguments to their extreme, the fundamental
alteration defense would essentially be swallowed whole,
because any feature (other than medical fitness) that thwarted
integration would be deemed discriminatory and thus its
224. L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 898 (11th Cir. 1998).
225. Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 304-05 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing the
plaintiff's request for surrogates as a modification of the attendant care program).

226. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
227. Id. at 593.
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elimination would not rise to the level of a fundamental
alteration. A court might eschew such a drastic result.
Third, such a result would appear to require substantial
affirmative action on the part of the public entity. Assume, for
sake of illustration, that a state offered a community-care
program for which an institutionalized individual was
ineligible, such as in the case of an individual who could
survive community care with extra assistance but who did not
fulfill certain eligibility requirements. If the State were required
to provide community care in such a context, then it would be
required to create a substantially new program. Defendants
could argue that such "affirmative
action" is not required
22
under Alexander v. Choate.

In the end, the success of program integrity arguments in this
context will turn on particular facts and a particular court's
deference to regulatory discretion, i.e., the entity's power to
define the benefits it offers. Nonetheless, even if a creative
court were to refuse to respect the state-created eligib.lity
requirements, and thereby reject the program integrity
argument, a public entity could still argue that the modification
effects a fundamental alteration on other grounds discussed
below. 9
3.

Plaintiffs Who Are Medically Fitfor Community Treatment,Meet
State Requirementsfor Release,
but Nonetheless Still Have Not Been Transferred
a. FindingofFundamentalAlteration Less Likely

The third general type of case concerns plaintiffs seeking
community treatment who are both medically fit and satisfy
state eligibility criteria for such care, but who still have not
been transferred due to error, administrative convenience, or a
lack of available community slots. In this context, a court is less
likely to deem a court ordered transfer to be a fundamental
alteration or an unreasonable modification. Although a public
entity may argue that requiring transfer would impede agency
discretion, such discretion might not be deemed an essential
non-discriminatory feature.
228. See S.E. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,411 (1979).
229. See discussion infra at Part II.C (discussing "magnitude" arguments).
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Four courts have held that requiring community care of
eligible plaintiffs is not a fundamental alteration or an
unreasonable modification. First, in Helen L., 23' the Third
Circuit held that releasing a single eligible physically
handicapped patient into community care did not constitute a
fundamental alteration under Title II, even though no
community-care slots were available within the State's budget.
One of the plaintiffs, Idell S., had been deemed eligible for the
attendant care program, but she was placed on a waiting list
due to a lack of funding." 1 The Third Circuit held that Title II
and the Integration Regulation required that she be transferred
to the State's attendant care program.3 2
After concluding that the Integration Regulation applies to
unnecessarily institutionalized individuals, the Third Circuit
held that the requested accommodation was neither
unreasonable nor a fundamental alteration, because the
transfer would not change the "requirements" or "substance" of
the state programs. 33 Further, the court emphasized that the
attendant care placement would be cheaper than
institutionalized care: "Ironically, DPW asserts a justification of
administrative convenience to resist an accommodation that
would save an average of $34,500 per year, would allow Idell S.
to live at home with her children, and which would not require
a single change in attendant care or nursing home
programs."' The court further held that the failure of the state
legislature to apportion funds appropriately between the
nursing care program and the attendant care program
provided no defense, because Title II applied to the legislature
as well. z 5
Second, in Wasserman, the district court held that where
developmentally disabled individuals had been placed in
community care, providing such care for similarly situated
individuals did not constitute a fundamental alteration. 6 The
court noted that the placements of some of the class action
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,337 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 331-35.
Id. at338.
Id.
Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524,526 (1996).
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plaintiffs indicated that "what the plaintiffs seek is not a
'fundamental alteration' in programs already offered by the
state." 7 Thus, the court rejected the defendants' program
integrity arguments and deferred the determination of cost
issues for further fact finding.
Third, in Kathleen S., one of the most sweeping applications
of Title II and the Integration Regulation to date, a
Pennsylvania federal district court recently held that the state
program had violated the ADA by failing to initiate plans for
community placements of institutionalized individuals."
Haverford State Hospital was scheduled to close on June 30,
1998, and plaintiffs brought a class action suit consisting of
three sub-classes: (A) eighty-eight individuals deemed ready
for a community placement but who had not yet been placed
due to a scheduled delay; (B) ninety-five individuals deemed
ready for a community placement but who would be placed
into a different state hospital because community services were
not presently available; and (C) sixty-eight individuals deemed
unsuited for a community placement who would be
transferred to another state hospital. 239
With regards to subclasses A and B, the court relied on Helen
L. and L. C. to conclude that the DPW had violated ADA Title II,
and the court ordered that both groups be placed in
community-care services.24 The court also held, with slender
rationale, that the planning and creation of the community
services did not constitute a fundamental alteration.24' The
court noted that DPW had failed to present evidence to support
a finding of fundamental alteration. The court also noted that
DPW had an obligation under state law to provide mental
health care in the least restrictive means available-implying,
although the court did not explicitly make the connection, that
an order requiring fulfillment of an existing obligation did not
interfere with an essential feature or otherwise constitute a
fundamental alteration.
Fourth, although the Eleventh Circuit in L.C. did not
squarely resolve the question of fundamental alteration, the
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at528.
Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460 (E.D. Pa 1998).
Id. at 471-74.
Id. at 471-73.
Id. at 471.
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court did hold that providing community care to medically
eligible plaintiffs did not constitute an unreasonable
modification "in the run of cases." 2 Further, on remand, the
district court held that an imposed community transfer would
not constitute a fundamental alteration.243 The district court
held that the $20,000 additional expenditure to provide
community care to both L.C. and E.W. was not substantial in
light of the State's overall mental health budget.2'
The Supreme Court, however, did not fully embrace the
Eleventh Circuit's view on that score. Indeed, a broad reading
of the Supreme Court's opinion in L.C. would counsel in favor
of a fundamental alteration defense where the reason for the
failure to transfer is a lack of available community slots. The
Court announced the following:
To maintain a range of facilities and to administer services
with an even hand, the State must have more leeway than
the courts below understood the fundamental-alteration
defense to allow. If, for example, the State were to
demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified persons with mental
disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that
moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's
endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the
reasonable-modifications standard would be met.... In such
circumstances, a court would have no warrant effectively to
order displacement of persons at the top of the communitybased treatment waiting list
245 by individuals lower down who
commenced civil actions.
Under the circumstances addressed by that language, then,
refusing to transfer a given individual due to the lack of
available slots in the community program would apparently
not violate Title II.
Nonetheless, the lack-of-slots defense would appear to be
effective only where the state has a "comprehensive, effectively
working plan.., and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable
242. L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 904 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations
omitted).
243. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at *5 n.1, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat
1999 WL 149653 (citing court order).
244 See id.
245. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 605-06 (1999) (citations
omitted).
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pace." 246 Thus,

a prospective

plaintiff

who

is

denied

community care on the grounds that the required program
lacked space would still be able to attack the entire system on the
grounds that the system unnecessarily segregates, and that it is
not one that is "comprehensive" and "effectively working." At
this point, the program integrity arguments dovetail with the
magnitude arguments discussed below at Part ll.C.
b.

AdministrativeDiscretion Offers a Possible but Controversial
EssentialFeature

A defendant state program might also argue that allowing
state hospital experts and officials to have ultimate control over
who is released is an essential purpose, given that they are best
situated to understand the needs of the patients as well as the
requirements for smoothly running the institution. Thus,
requiring community care would effect a fundamental
alteration, because the experts would be less able to use their
fiscal and medical expertise to ensure the hospital's viability
and effectiveness. Petitioners in L.C. made essentially this
contention, in a moderate form, in the course of their argument
before the Eleventh Circuit:
[The L. C. opinion] fails to give deference to medical and
administrative judgment, by restricting state officials from
considering the legitimate and traditional factors they would
normally weigh in making these decisions (including the
patients' and family members' preferences, quality of care,
cost, and availability), and substituting therefore an247overreaching commitment to least restrictive environment.
The success of this argument will rest on a court's
willingness to grant deference to administrative discretion, as

distinct from professional discretion248 and regulatory
discretion.24 9 Two arguments might persuade a court to reject
such deference. First, where individuals medically qualify for
community care and satisfy the state requirements for such
care, a court might conclude that such decisions are merely a
matter of administrative convenience, not an alteration of the
246. Id.
247. Brief for Petitioners at *38, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring 527 U.S. 581 (1999)
(No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL 54623 (citations omitted).
248. See discussion supra at Part II.B.1.d.
249. See discussion supra at Part II.B.2.a.
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"requirements" or "substance" of the program."' The House
Judiciary Report accompanying ADA Title II explains that
"[tihe fact that it is more convenient, either administratively or
fiscally, to provide services in a segregated manner, does not
constitute a valid justification for separate or different services
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, or under this
title.

251

Second, courts might view such administrative discretion as
a license to violate Title II and the Integration Regulation and
thus refuse to deem such discretion an essential feature. As
with other forms of discretion as potential essential features,
extreme deference to entity discretion would all but eliminate
the application of Title II and the Integration Regulation. Any
refusal to provide community care could be defended by the
sanctity of the judgment of the administrators of a public
program. That conclusion accords with the extreme view
offered in the Petitioners' Brief in L. C. shortly after asserting the
essential nature of administrative discretion: "[The L.C.
opinion] fails to recognize that a decision requiring the 'least
restrictive' treatment will always 'fundamentally alter'
Georgia's provision of mental health services." 25 If the
application of the Integration Regulation would always result in
an uncalled-for fundamental alteration, then the Integration
Regulation would be reduced to empty verbiage. To the extent
that courts embrace the application of the Integration
Regulation, they may be unwilling to destroy it through the
back door of an overbroad fundamental alteration defense.
Indeed, the pre-L.C, opinions discussed above-Helen L.,
Wasserman, and Kathleen S., in addition to the Eleventh Circuit's
L.C. opinion-scream with their silence by declining to
recognize administrative discretion as an essential feature.
An argument similar to the one a public entity defendant
might pursue failed in the recent and highly publicized Martin

250. See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir. 1995) (no fundamental
alteration where neither "requirements" or "substance" of the program were
changed).
251. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
473; see also L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 902 (11th Cir. 1998)
(quoting the House Judiciary Report); Helen L., 46 F.3d at 338 (quoting same).
252. Brief for Petitioners at *38, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999)
(No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL 54623 (citations omitted).

No. 3]

Forwardto FundamentalAlteration

v. PGA TourA 5 in which the Ninth Circuit determined (and the
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed) that fettering the
discretion of those who implemented Professional Golf
Association ("PGA") rules did not constitute a fundamental
alteration, because allowing the PGA unfettered authority
would effectively exempt the PGA from Title III. Casey Martin,
a physically handicapped professional golfer, sued the PGA in
order to force the organization to allow him to use a golf cart
during tournament play.'
The PGA argued that any
modification of the PGA's power to make and enforce the rules
of golf would be a fundamental alteration.255 However, if a
fundamental alteration were found, the Ninth Circuit
determined that PGA rule makers would be permitted to
defend wanton discrimination on the grounds that their
discretion was an essential feature. Of course, Martin is
distinguishable on its facts. A hospital's control over its
patients is perhaps more central to the hospital's essential
functions than the PGA's control over arguably minor rules.
Still, the underlying principle may be persuasive, and a court
might hold that allowing state employees complete discretion
over the release of individuals would be the same as exempting
the state agency from Title II and the Integration Regulation.
As in Martin, a court might eschew such a result.
The Supreme Court's opinion in L.C. provides a hook for
these arguments. The Court's opinion indicates that failure to
provide community care to an eligible individual is not
justified "by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully
populated."256 There still lies a risk that the wolf of untamed
administrative discretion will cloak itself in the sheep's
clothing of professional discretion. 7 For this reason, some

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), afftd, - U.S. -, 2001 WL 567717 (May 29, 2001).
Id. at996.
Id. at 999.
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 606 (1999).
Susan Stefan writes:

Professionals... who work in state institutions have conflicting obligations: to
the state, whose budgetary demands restrict state employees' behavior; to the
institution, which might be more concerned about safety and security than
treatment; and to the patients, who did not seek their care and who, for the
most part, have no desire to be patients in the first place.
Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication

Under the ProfessionalJudgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 661 (1992); see also
Joanne Karger, Note, "Don't Tread on the ADA ": Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring
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level of independent inquiry into the reasonableness of the
state program's determinations is probably appropriate,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's stated deference to the
"State's treatment professionals." 25
On the other hand, as the Supreme Court's L. C. opinion
notes, purely administrative discretion must be respected at
some level. 59 Given the fact that an individual's conditions
change, absent frictionless transfer between programs, there
will often be individuals waiting for transfers. Further, difficult
judgments of whether and how much to deinstitutionalize can
bind administrators. The Integration Regulation has been cited
for the proposition that a state may not keep people in
institutions when community care is appropriate, 26 and for the
proposition that a state may not release an individual into
community care when they require institutional care.2 61 Thus,
states may be caught between the Scylla of not shifting to
community care enough and the Charybdis of shifting too
much. This strait would counsel towards some deference to
administrative discretion. However, the weight of the case law
suggests that such discretion will be tightly fettered. Unfettered
administrative discretion could operate as a shield for neglect,
the very thing disability legislation intends to remedy. 2 2 But
even if a court rejects administrative discretion as an essential
feature, thus leaving a public entity defendant without an
institutional integrity argument, that defendant could still
and the Futureof Community Integrationfor Individuals with MentalDisabilities,40 B.C.
L. REV. 1221, 1252-53 (1999). Indeed, a federal district court has addressed a case
in which state mental health professionals failed to recommend community
treatment for mentally disabled patients who admittedly would have been better
served in such settings, because the state had not provided sufficient funding. See
Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 757 F. Supp. 1243, 1312 (D.N.M.
1990), rev'd in part,964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
258. L.C., 527 U.S. at 607. At least one commentator has argued that "the Court
should have created room for an adversarial contest in which patients would be
able to challenge the adverse judgments of their state treatment teams." The
Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200,332 (1999).
259. See L.C., 527 U.S. at 605-06 (recognizing the possibility of waiting lists even
in efficiently run programs).
260. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 1995); L.C., 527 U.S.
at 607.
261. See Cable v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 973 F. Supp. 937 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
262 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) ("Discrimination against
the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not of
invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign
neglect.").
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assert fundamental alteration defenses in terms of magnitude.
C. MagnitudeArguments

Arguments respecting the kind of change may give way to, or
at least be strengthened by, arguments respecting the degree of
a change. If courts fail to grant relevant deference to
professional, regulatory, and administrative discretion, and
thus reject a finding of fundamental alteration based on
program integrity arguments, defendants may still pursue
arguments of magnitude. A large class action suit presents these
magnitude arguments most strongly, and thus presents a
greater likelihood that a court will find a fundamental
alteration. First, accommodating the plaintiffs in a large class
263
would presumably result in a greater financial burden.
Second, accommodating a large class would present a greater
risk of broad deinstitutionalization. 2' 6 The intermediate
appellate court in L.C. highlighted the distinction of the class
action suit context:
We note that this case is not a class action, but a challenge
brought on behalf of two individual plaintiffs. Our holding
is not meant to resolve the more difficult questions of
fundamental alteration that might be present in a class
action suit seeking deinstitutionalization of a state
hospital.2
Notably, the courts in L.C. and Helen L. required community
care for a combined total of three individuals. Thus, in those
cases defendants' arguments
relating to the magnitude of a
266
change rang quietly.

The small numbers involved in the L. C. and Helen L. cases are
not shared in all cases, however. The first reported class action
suit in the ADA Title II community-care context was Conner v.

263. See discussion supra at Part II.B.1.
264. See discussion supra at Part II.B.2.
265. L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 n.10 (11th Cir. 1998).
266. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court broadened the fundamental alteration
defense such that placement in community care may be avoided if "in the
allocation of available resources, immediate relief would be inequitable, given
the . . . large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities."
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999). This fits well into the
program integrity rubric, in which courts will resist changes to a program that
contravene essential elements of the State's system-presumably including in
some general way the State's system for ranking the preference for placements.

HarvardJournalofLaw & PublicPolicy

[Vol. 24

Branstad.267 In Conner, a district court held in the context of a
class action suit that Title II did not require community care for
disabled individuals.2 8 The court held with limited reasoning
that Iowa was not required to create alternative communitybased services because Title II does not require "fundamental"
or "substantial" modifications.2 6 9 Since Conner, recent, large
class actions such as Kathleen S. and Cramerv. Chiles have gone

the way of the plaintiffs. The forthcoming discussion uses
existing precedent to articulate potentially successful
magnitude arguments.
1. FinancialBurden

First among the magnitude related arguments is cost.
According to the following analysis, a financial burden may
contribute to a finding of fundamental alteration under Title II,
provided that (1) the burden is significant (i.e., it changes the
substance of the program); (2) the alteration requires more than
merely a shift of funds from one item to another within an
agency's budget; and (3) facts support the claim. Each of these
would be more likely in a large class action suit.
a. A Cost Defense Accompanies Title II Through the Backdoor

The regulations and legislative history do not clarify the
availability of a cost defense in the context of community-care
cases, but the weight of judicial authority counsels towards the
recognition of such a defense. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Olmstead v. L.C. removed any doubt about the existence of a
cost defense; courts are explicitly instructed to "tak[e] into
account the resources available to the State."27 Whereas the
existence of a cost defense is clear, its origin is less so.
Regulations under the Rehabilitation Act and the portions of
Title II-B regarding communication and architectural barriers
have led courts to recognize two primary defenses to claims
under those sections. In addition to the "fundamental
alteration" defense, which typically operates to limit required
changes to those that would not compromise a program's
267.
268.
269.
270.

839 F. Supp. 1346 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
Id. at 1357-58.
Id. at1358.
L.C., 527 U.S. at 587, 607.
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integrity,2" the "undue burden" defense allows defendants to
argue that the accommodation sought by the plaintiff is simply
too costly to bear. However, the DOJ, following congressional
instruction, included only the fundamental alteration defense
in the regulations specifying the scope of the Integration
Regulation. 27 ' At least one commentator has thus argued that a
cost defense should not constrain the operation of the
Integration Regulation.2 ' On the other hand, the DOJ itself has
applied the undue burden defense to the integration context in
providing examples of the limits of the Integration
Regulation.274 The apparent contradiction breeds confusion.275
Still, the weight of authority even before L.C. embraced at
least a limited cost defense. Despite the unclear legislative
history (or perhaps because of it), the cost defense has entered
the community-care discussion through the backdoor of
fundamental alteration; a financial burden is not required
where it would fundamentally alter the program. This
treatment has some support from opinions outside the
community-care context. 2 6 The exercise of defining the cost
defense by reference to fundamental alteration is inherently
circular-the very task at hand is to define the fundamental
alteration defense by reference to costs. The recognition of the
undue burden defense as a subset of the fundamental alteration
inquiry was set forth explicitly in Messier: "To establish [the
fundamental alteration defense], the defendants must prove

271. See Wood, supra note 132, at 504-05 (citing Cook, supranote 44, at 430-31).
272 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2000); Wood, supra note 132, at 505.
273. See Cook, supra note 44, at 430-31, 457-65; cf Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Equal
Members of the Community: The Public Accommodations Provisions of the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 551 (1991) (arguing that the fundamental
alteration limit imposes a higher level of obligation upon operators of public
accommodations than does the undue hardship limit upon employees).
274. See Wood, supra note 132, at 505 ("For example, it may constitute an undue
burden for a public accommodation, which provides a full-time interpreter in its
special guided tour for individuals with hearing impairments, to hire an
additional interpreter for those individuals who choose to attend the integrated
program.") (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A at § 35.130 (1997)).
275. See id. at 503 ("[T]he muddy legislative history of the ADA... seems both
to invite courts to and to preclude courts from considering costs.").
276. See, e.g., McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 462
(6th Cir. 1997) (requiring no waivers where such a requirement would "increase
the cost of making the assessments"); cf Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Penn., 926
F.2d 1368, 1386 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that in a Rehabilitation Act case,
"[a]ccommodations that are reasonable must not unduly strain financial
resources").
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that plaintiffs' requested relief would: (1) alter the essential
nature of its program; or (2) impose an undue burden or
hardship in light of the overall program."2' In Wasserman, the
district court noted that that "undue financial burden must be
considered in analyzing the reasonableness of a requested
modification accommodation" and determined that issues of
material fact existed as to the relative cost of institutionalization as compared to community-based treatment. 278 The
Supreme Court shared the express recognition of cost as an
element of the fundamental alteration defense. The L.C.
opinion expressly instructs district courts to consider both "the
cost of providing community-based care to the litigants" and
also "the range of services the state provides others with
mental disabilities, and the state's obligation to mete out those
services equitably." 279 This formulation of the cost defense
accords with the Department of Justice view, which was set
forth in its amicus brief in L. C.280

The Third Circuit's treatment of the cost defense was less
clear. In Easley, the court apparently embraced the undue
burden defense when determining that the use of surrogates
would be unreasonable because it would "create an undue and
perhaps impossible burden on the State."281 Moreover, the
Third Circuit in Helen L. refused to find a fundamental
alteration where community care would be less burdensome to
the State.' z Although the Third Circuit did not explicitly
embrace an undue burden defense, the court did emphasize the
cost savings in rejecting defendants' arguments.' Likewise,
the Pennsylvania district court in Kathleen S. examined at some
length the comparative costs between institutionalized care and

277. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706(EBB), 1999 WL
20910, at *11 (D.Conn. Jan. 5,1999) (citations omitted).
278. Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524,528 (D. Md. 1996).
279. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,597 (1999).
280. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at *7,
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL
149653 ("If a State can show that any additional costs of providing placement in a
community setting are unreasonably high in comparison to a State's budget,
however, a State would not be required to provide placement in a community
setting.").
281. Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297,305 (3d Cir. 1994).
282 Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,338 (3d Cir. 1995).
283. Id.
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the requested accommodation.? However, in Charles Q. v.
Houstoun,28 another district court in Pennsylvania refused to
consider costs. Still, even the Charles Q. court did not mandate
a significant outlay of funds, and the court merely required
community care for two individuals who qualified for it. 6 The
Supreme Court's recent opinion resolves the confusion, at least
as to the existence of a cost defense, if not as to the scope of such
a defense.
Several related arguments contend that the ADA
requirements should be limited to avoid undue financial
burdens. First and obviously, states have a legitimate need to
budget. Second, if costs do not enter the legal inquiry, then in
order to cabin runaway expenses states will have incentive to
favor options that cut the types of care offered, allowing them
to rest on their program integrity arguments. If a state cannot
limit the amount of dollars explicitly, then it may do it
implicitly by scaling back services or the number of covered
individuals. Such categorical cuts will leave certain people
without needed care. Further, such cuts might not lead to
optimal uses of resources-some individuals might receive the
benefits of significant resources, whereas others get none. This
state of affairs would not only be inequitable, but might also be
inefficient if the person receiving care is suffering from
diminishing marginal utility. That is, a dollar of care to a
person receiving little or no state-funded care might be worth
more than a dollar of care to a person receiving a lot of care.
Commentators have argued that costs inevitably enter the
disability discrimination discussion given the inherent nature
of the problem. 7 Unlike traditional discrimination contexts
where the goal is strictly the removal of barriers to equal
treatment, equality for disabled individuals under the ADA
requires special treatment. Thus, the relationship between

284. Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460,475 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(concluding that community care would be significantly cheaper than institutional
care).

285. No. CIV. A. 1:CV-95-280, 1996 WL 447549, at *6 (M.D. Pa. April 22, 1996)
(unpublished opinion) ("An agency's claim that it lacks funding to serve a
disabled person is not sufficient [to constitute a fundamental alteration].").
286. See id. at *2-*6.
287. See Robert Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN:
ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 265, 309-11 (Robert H. Mnookin
ed., 1985); Wood, supranote 132, at 507-08.
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litigants does not end after the plaintiff wins a lawsuit, but
rather the plaintiff remains dependent on the defendant. This
creates the problem of "insatiable demand," in the context of
which a discussion of resource limits on such demand becomes
inevitable 8 8 In light of these considerations, the arguments
favoring a cost defense are even weightier.
b. Legal and FactualLimits Constraina Cost Defense
Three hurdles confront a defendant in its efforts to assert a
cost defense. First, a court is more likely to find a fundamental
alteration when the financial burden is substantial,meaning that
it (1) is so unreasonable in light of the whole program; (2)
amounts to more than mere fiscal inconvenience; and (3) alters
the substance of the program. A small burden is less likely to
be deemed a fundamental alteration, except as a matter of
program integrity as discussed earlier. The House Judiciary
Report suggests that a mere fiscal inconvenience would not
constitute a valid defense.289 Further, prior to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Olmstead v. L.C., the Eleventh and Third
Circuits had taken the position that a burden will not constitute
a fundamental alteration where there is no alteration to the
substance of the program. The Eleventh Circuit in L. C. held that
the State must show that expenditures are so unreasonable that
they would "fundamentally alter[] the service [the agency]
provides." 290 The Helen L. court likewise refused to hold that a
fundamental alteration or unreasonable modification had
occurred where neither the "requirements" nor the "substance"
changed. 9 ' Additionally, the DOJ view and the Supreme Court
opinion in L.C. explain that a fundamental alteration will
accrue only if the burden is viewed in light of the entire
program.' 2 In essence, these authorities suggests that any cost
288. See Wood, supra note 132, at 507-08 (citing Burt, supra note 287).
289. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
290. L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 904 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis
added).
291. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,338 (3d Cir. 1995).
292. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999) ("In evaluating a
State's fundamental-alteration defense, the District Court must consider, in view
of the resources available to the State, not only the cost of providing communitybased care to the litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others
with mental disabilities, and the State's obligation to mete out those services
equitably."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at *5 n.1, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat
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defense is limited in its application. 293 The district court in
Messier recently offered a formulation of the cost defense that
clearly related back to program integrity concepts:
Inadequate funding ordinarily will not excuse
noncompliance with the ADA or Section 504. .

.

. Yet,

integration cannot be achieved at any cost. Where plaintiffs'
requested relief would be so unreasonable, given the
demands of the State's mental health. budget and resources,
that it would alter the essential nature of its294 service,
defendants may avoid making an accommodation.
A small burden would presumably require only minor
changes in the budget and thus not force a change in the
substance of a program. A large financial burden, on the other
hand, would reduce the quantity and quality of care that the
defendant public entity could offer, and thus such a burden
would change the substance of a program.
Second, a court perhaps should be reluctant to find a
fundamental alteration based solely upon a required shift of
funds from an institutional care program to a community-care
program. That is, if requiring the provision of community care
to prospective plaintiffs would impose no increased overall
financial burden, the fact that the community-care program
was insufficiently funded in comparison to the institutional
care program would not likely justify a finding of fundamental
alteration. The Eleventh Circuit in L.C. noted that insufficient
funds would not justify a failure to offer community care,
where the budget could be reasonably modified by the public
entity defendant. 295 The court noted that where a reasonable
fund shift could suffice, "the ADA does not permit the State to
justify its discriminatory treatment of individuals with
disabilities on the grounds that providing non-discriminatory
treatment will require additional expenditures of State
funds."296
1999 WL 149653 (arguing that modification is not required if cost is "unreasonably
high in comparison to a State's... budget").
293. The reference of the cost defense to the effect on a program's substance
again shows the conflation of program integrity and magnitude concepts.
294. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706(EBB), 1999 WL
20910, at *11 (D.Conn. Jan. 5,1999) (citations omitted).
295. L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 904 (11th Cir. 1998).
296. Id. at 904-05 (citing United States v. Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d 740 (11th Cir.
1990) (holding that $15,000 bus system modification did not unduly burden
university)).
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The Third Circuit in Helen L. went even further and held that
requiring a fund shift would not constitute a fundamental
alteration even where the agency defendant lacked the power to
authorize the shift.297 Pennsylvania provided funds to the
community-care program and the institutional care program
under separate lines of the budget, and under state law the
agency was not qualified to authorize a shift of funds from line
to line. However, the court held that Title II applied to the
legislature as well as to the state agency, and thus such a
funding mechanism could not justify discriminatory
treatment.298 Correspondingly, in Charles Q., another case
concerning Pennsylvania's Norristown State Hospital, the
district court rejected a defense based on the insufficient
funding of the community-care program. 29 The court noted
that "[a]n agency's claim that it lacks funding to serve a
disabled person is not sufficient" to justify a failure to provide
community care to those patients who qualified."' 0 If a court
follows the Third Circuit view, a required shift of funds
(without a demonstrable increase in overall financial burden)
would not constitute a fundamental alteration even in the
absence of agency power to authorize the shift. Even if a court
does not embrace the Third Circuit's view, where the agency is
empowered to authorize the shift, a finding of fundamental
alteration is unlikely.
The pains taken by the Supreme Court's opinion in L.C. to
disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's narrow cost defense casts
doubt on any argument that would greatly shrink a cost
defense, but the Court did not explicitly address the issue of
fund shifts. Still, the Court's opinion suggests one important
exception: A fund shift is unlikely to be required if it threatens
to harm the institution. 0 '
Third, a significant hurdle to a cost defense will be factual;
integrated care may in fact be cheaper than institutionalized
care. Proponents of community care cite evidence that care can
be provided in the community more cheaply than in
297. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,337-38 (3d Cir. 1995).
298. Id. at 338.
299. Charles Q. v. Houstoun, No. CIV. A. 1:CV-95-280, 1996 WL 447549, at *6
(M.D. Pa. April 22,1996) (unpublished opinion).
300. Id.
301. See discussion infra at Part II.C.2.
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Indeed, courts that have ordered the provision
of community care, perhaps not coincidentally, have found it to
be the cheaper option. The Eleventh Circuit in L.C., although
remanding for further findings, noted the district court's
determination that "the State currently provided communitybased services ...and that such services could be provided at
less cost than segregated services."30 3 Further, in Cramer v.
Chiles, a district court within the Eleventh Circuit stated
generally that community care is cheaper than, as well as
superior to, institutional care: "Today, it is uniformly agreed
among experts that non-institutional living is far superior,
economically and medically, to traditional institutional housing
for persons with developmental disabilities."3 °
Likewise, the Helen L. court held in the context of specific
facts that community care would be less expensive than
institutionalized care. The court found that providing
community care would save an average of $34,500 per year.30 5
Within the same circuit, the district court in Kathleen S. found
that provision of community care to plaintiffs would not result
in additional unreasonable expenditures. 3 6 The court noted
that whereas the annual per person cost inside the large
Pennsylvania institutions was roughly $110,000, the amount
paid to counties per deinstitutionalized individual was only
about $65,000.307 The court acknowledged but did not calculate
additional costs that would arise from the transfer to
community care, but merely asserted that these would be
shared by the counties and the federal government.0 '

302. See discussion supra at Part I.B.1.
303. L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 905 (11th Cir. 1998).
304. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342,1350 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
305. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,338 (3d Cir. 1995).
306. Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460,475 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
307. Id.
308. Id. Note that federal money is also available for the treatment of the
mentally handicapped, and commentators have argued that the funding schemes
favor community-based services because a state can potentially receive more
federal money from increasing its provision of community care relative to
institutional care. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of 58 Former State Commissioners
and Directors of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities in Support of
Respondents at 9-13, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98536), available at 1999 WL 143935 (discussing financial ramifications of federal
preference for community care); Gary A. Smith et al., The HCB Waiver Program:
The Fadingof Medicaid's "InstitutionalBias", in MENTAL RETARDATION 262 (1996).
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c.

FactualCostArguments Are Available
Of course, these findings of fact are not binding on future
cases. Further, as defendants' emphasis shifts from trying to
prevent application of the Integration Regulation to trying to
formulate arguments and evidence to support a finding of
fundamental alteration, several avenues may be available. Over
the short run, the task of operating both community and
institutional systems and the difficulty of shifting the focus
towards community care will likely result in large
expenditures. First, in states where few community programs
exist, the cost of starting them up must be added to the
calculus. For instance, Texas offers extensive institutional care
but limited community care, and a mandate of community care
would result in costs associated with designing and developing
new services.3 0 9 Second, requiring the least restrictive
alternative would effectively require states to review
individually each institutionalized individual and determine
whether they could be treated in the community. 310 Assuming
the superiority of community care, these costs are laudable and
inevitable. However, they at least must be added to the
balancing as courts consider interposing their will on the
State's budget.
Over the medium term, constant overhead costs could
combine with the increased costs of conferring community care
to create a significant economic burden. As institutions begin to
empty, the facility-based reimbursement schemes will confront
problems. Institutions are typically reimbursed based on a
daily bed rate, and due to fixed overhead costs they must
remain at or near capacity. As the population in institutions
decreases, the daily per capita rate rises as the relatively fixed
costs are spread over fewer residents. 1' This is merely one
309. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the States in Support of Petitioners at app. A,
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (98-536), available at 1999 WL
60990. Texas houses 5,332 individuals in thirteen state schools, and 14,152 in
private intermediate care facilities, but provides only limited community-care
programs. See DAVID BRADDOCK Fr. AL, THE STATE OF THE STATES IN

DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 25-27,437-38 (5th ed. 1998).
310. See L.C. by Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 904-05 (11th Cir. 1998)
(requiring the State to perform individualized review to determine whether
community-based care would be unreasonable); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of
the States in Support of Petitioners at *17, Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S.
581 (1999) (No. 98-536), availableat 1999 WL 60990.
311. See BRADDOCK ET AL., supra note 309, at 27 ("Aggregate staffing of
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effect of the fixed nature of the costs of running a large
institution. For instance, Georgia (the defendant in L. C.) spent
$3.3 million annually to maintain the hospital buildings, and
that cost does not shrink as the census shrinks.' Thus, if
transfers to community care were ordered, the aggregate costs
of the community-care program would rise (due to increased
enrollment), but the aggregate costs of institutional care
program would remain relatively flat (while providing for a
fewer number of patients).
The Supreme Court acknowledged the problem with "costs
the States cannot avoid; most notably, a State . .

.

may

experience increased overall expenses by funding community
placements without being able to take advantage of the savings
associated with the closure of institutions."31 This fixed-cost
problem was explained succinctly by the Eleventh Circuit in
L.C.:

There is evidence in the record that suggests that, because of
the fixed overhead costs associated with providing
institutional care, the State will be able to save money by
moving patients from institutionalized care to communitybased care only when it shuts down entire hospitals or
hospital wings, but not when it mo, s one or two patients
from a hospital into the community.
L.C., of course, concerned only two patients. However, where
there are tens or hundreds of plaintiffs, or where a court
recognizes that its opinion will effect overall state policy (and
thus hundreds of non-plaintiff patients), a strong case may be
made that transfer to a community-care setting will result in
expanded costs even absent changing conditions or increased
demand for services." 4 Thus, states may achieve overall
savings through transfer of large numbers of patients to
community-care programs only by simultaneously closing
institutions has declined substantially but less rapidly than the residential census.
As a result, average daily costs have risen substantially .... ).
312. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 604 (1999) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
313. L.C., 138 F.3d at 905.
314. Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F. Supp. 524,531 (D. Md. 1996) ("Helen L. does
not support the imposition of court-ordered relief that would require transferring
millions of dollars from institutions to the community or otherwise fundamentally
altering the state's programs."); cf Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 1994)
("ITIhe test to determine the reasonableness of a modification is whether it alters
the essential nature of the program or imposes an undue burden or hardship in
light of the entire program.").
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existing institutions.
Further, community-based treatment may not be less
expensive than institutionalization over the long term due to
potentially changing conditions of both institutional and
community care. 315 First, the employment and operating
conditions of community care could change. In the Pennhurst
case, for example, an expert testified that personnel costs were
the largest expenditure item for both community and
institutional residences and that the personnel costs were
higher for institutions because of the higher salaries there,
which were driven by seniority differences. 316 As more
resources are directed towards community programs,
institutional employees may not continue to hold such an
experience advantage and may not continue to merit higher
salaries.
Second, if the pool of recipients of community-care changes,
costs may increase. As larger numbers of severely handicapped
people exit institutions, the costs of providing adequate care to
those people in the community might turn out to be higher
than the costs of treating the average individual receiving care
now, and that average cost could rise. That is, current cost
figures of community care may be artificially low due to the
sample of care recipients. If and when institutions close, that
sample will change.
Third, costs will rise if demand for services rises. Demand for
community care may be relatively higher than demand for
institutional care, and as the supply and range of community
programs is increased, demand may rise as well.317 For
example, some individuals who would qualify for state
institutional care may not partake of such care, but would take
advantage of community programs if more widely offered. For
instance, imagine a developmentally disabled individual who
has extended family that takes care of him, given the family's
preference for self-funded community living over state-funded
institutional care. However, if community programs were more
widely available, and thus community living were to coexist
315. See Burt, supra note 287, at 329-30; Wood, supra note 132, at 531 (citing Burt
and noting that the cost inquiry could become more complex as defendants start
challenging the economic superiority of community care).
316. See Burt, supra note 287, at 330.
317. See id.
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with the receipt of state-funded care, families might be less
willing to provide self-funded care, and the subscription rate
for the state programs overall might rise as a consequence.
In the final analysis, the cost calculus is indeterminate. And
all of this assumes the irrelevance of potential social costs -such
as increased crime (both by and against handicapped
individuals), increased homelessness, and decreased property
values, and of potential social benefits-such as increased
participation of handicapped individuals in the workforce.
Still, it is clear that cost arguments will be at the fore of
community-care battles, and this prospect counsels in favor of
the continuation of research and dialogue on the subject.
2. Broad Deinstitutionalization
In a context in which the required shift of institutionalized
individuals into community-care programs threatens to
deinstitutionalize care by emptying and bankrupting state
hospitals, such accommodation would likely constitute a
fundamental alteration and, therefore, Title II would not
require it. This result of course appears more likely in the
context of a large class action suit. If state programs are
required to apportion funds to the community programs away
from the institutional care programs, the remaining funds
might be insufficient to maintain a viable institutional care
facility. Due to the high overhead costs, pulling away large
numbers of patients could render inefficient the operation of a
large institution. Closed institutions could harm the
individuals who are medically better served by such care.
Further, such deinstitutionalization could result in the same
problems that followed the deinstitutionalization of mentally ill
individuals-wide ranging homelessness and the creation of
ghettos inhabited by the mentally disabled. Especially in this
context of past failure, requiring broad deinstitutionalization
could constitute a fundamental alteration.
Deinstitutionalization would preclude the realization of
important purposes of state programs-including caring for
those who require institutionalized care and preventing
homelessness. Moreover, deinstitutionalization would change
the essential nature of a state program, in Easley's words-
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"change the entire focus of the program" and "create a program
that the State never envisioned."318 States could arguably cope
with court orders by scaling back state-operated institutions
and paying private hospitals to take care of the remaining
individuals who required institutional care, but remedies that
would shut down or substantially burden existing institutions
might lead to hasty responses and individuals slipping through
the cracks. Although indeterminate under this brief analysis, to
the extent that the arguments could be made factually, they
would be available legally.
Even before L.C., Courts have generally held that Title II and
the
Integration
Regulation
do
not
mandate
deinstitutionalization per se. Helen L. notes that
"deinstitutionalization" is "something which the ADA does not
require. "319 For that proposition, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's opinion in Pennhurst, in which the Court
concluded that deinstitutionalization involved "massive"
changes in state programs and was not required absent clear
statutory command.320 The Eleventh Circuit in L.C. likewise
noted that "our holding does not mandate the
deinstitutionalization of individuals with disabilities."32'
Several lower courts have echoed this general principle that
whatever level of integrated care the ADA requires, it does not
mandate such a level that might be
deemed
deinstitutionalization.3 ' The district court in the ongoing
318. Easley, 36 F.3d at 305.
319. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 336 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Pennhurst State
Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981)).
320. Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 24.
321. L.C., 138 F.3d at 902.
322. Greist v. Norristown State Hosp., No. CIV.A.96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997) (citing Helen L., 146 F.3d 325, for the proposition that
the ADA does not mandate deinstitutionalization); Williams v. Wasserman, 937 F.
Supp. 524,531 (D. Md. 1996) ("Helen L. does not support... 'transferring millions
of dollars from institutions to the community .... (internal quotations omitted));
Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346, 1357 (S.D. Iowa 1993) ("[Nleither the
explicit language of the ADA nor its legislative history call for or require
deinstitutionalization of mentally disabled individuals."); cf Kathleen S. v. Dep't
of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460,470 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("It is abundantly clear that
the Plaintiffs in this legal action . . . are not seeking an order to
'deinstitutionalize."'); Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 916 F. Supp. 133, 140
(D.. Conn. 1996) (noting, in an earlier incarnation of the Messier litigation, that
"neither Section 504 nor the ADA confers 'a right to community placement"' but
holding that plaintiff succeeded in stating a claim of discrimination based on
severity of disability); Williams v. Sec'y of Human Servs., 609 N.E. 2d 447, 452
(Mass. 1993) (rejecting claim of community care brought by mentally disabled

No. 3]

Forwardto FundamentalAlteration

767

Messier litigation applied this principle in order to limit the
relief available to plaintiffs. The court in Messier precluded
from potential relief the following: "(1) the ending of all new
admissions to STS [Southbury Training School]; (2) the
transferring of all residents to community settings; and (3) the
closure of STS. " 23
Although the intermediate appellate courts in Helen L. and
L.C. rejected the defendant's claim that requiring the plaintiffs
to be placed in community care constituted deinstitutionalization, those cases concerned only few individuals and did
not threaten the viability of the State's institutional care
program. The Third Circuit relied on the minor nature of the
burden on the state program 24 and expressly indicated that
deinstitutionalization was not required. 25 The Eleventh Circuit
was careful to note likewise.2 6 It also observed that "[t]he State
does not argue that the relief requested by [the plaintiffs] L.C.
and E.W. will effect a fundamental alteration by requiring it to
dismantle its provision of individualized care to individuals
with disabilities."

27

Thus, L.C., like Helen L., is distinguishable

from a case involving a massive shift to community care.
Indeed, if fundamental alteration means anything at all, it
presumably means that a state would not be forced to
dismantle substantial portions of its system to the possible
detriment of patients.323
With the issuance of the Supreme Court's opinion in L.C.,
more and stronger legal authority exists to cut against litigation
that would prematurely shut down state institutions. "[T]he
ADA is not reasonably read to impel States to phase out
institutions, placing patients in need of close care at risk. Nor is
it the ADA's mission to drive States to move institutionalized
individuals and noting that "nothing in the ADA requires that a specific
proportion of housing placements ... be in integrated housing").
323. Messier. Southbury Training Sch., No. 3:94-CV-1706(EBB), 1999 WL 20910,
at *2 (D.Conn. Jan. 5,1999).
324. Helen L., 46 F.3d at 338.
325. Id. at 336-37; see also Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24 (noting that
deinstitutionalization not required absent statutory command).
326. L.C., 138 F.3d at 902.
327. Id. at 904.
328. See William D. McCants, Note, Disability & ADA: Supreme Court Rule on

Institutional Confinement of Disabled, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 281, 283 (1999) ("If the
principle of liability announced by the Court is not applied with caution, states
might be pressured, for fear of litigation, into placing marginal patients into
integrated settings lacking necessary services.").
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patients into an appropriate setting, such as a homeless
shelter."329 Such drastic changes would not only effect large
burdens, but also radically change the essential nature of the
state programs. At this point, arguments of magnitude dovetail
with arguments of integrity. A change in degree becomes also a
change in type. Perhaps a somewhat circular ending is fitting in
an Article concerning the ADA. What is more clear is that the
issuance of the Supreme Court's opinion in L. C. should serve as
a beginning, rather than an end, to the inquiry and dialogue of
the issues surrounding community care.
III. CONCLUSION
Current scholarship and current case law have focused on
the application of the Integration Regulation and ADA Title II,
and with them the location of an important and justified prima
facie claim for community care, but little discussion has
regarded the extent of its stated limits. Given the apparent
benefits of community care, the legislative history of Title II,
the traditional deference for agency interpretations, and the
apparent relative weakness of states to solve the problem
without federal intervention, the Supreme Court in L.C. wisely
sided with the bulk of pre-existing case law and gave effect to
the Integration Regulation in the context of unnecessary
institutionalization. Now however, advocates must begin to
focus on the limits of Title II as signaled by the fundamental
alteration defense.
Program integrity arguments will serve defendants,
particularly where the discretion in question regards patient
welfare and legitimate concerns of program design, rather than
mere convenience. Defendants have strong integrity claims
where plaintiffs do not qualify for requested programs, but
such claims should have far less force when the criteria are
deemed traditionally waivable, discriminatory, or otherwise
nonessential. Defendants' claims also weaken where plaintiffs
qualify for requested programs but weak administrative
concerns have prevented transfer. In those cases in particular, a
discussion of magnitude arguments will become important.
Where substantial economic burdens would attach, or where
broad deinstitutionalization would result, defendants have
329. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimrihig, 527 U.S. 581, 584 (1999) (citations omitted).
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credible fundamental alteration claims. No clear statutory
limits give guidance, and in the end any limits, however vague,
may have to come from courts. Thus, using precedent as a
guide, advocates and scholars must fully comprehend the
possible and prudent nature of these limits in approaching
their ADA Title II practice and jurisprudence.

